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Abstract 
A series of UK higher education reforms over the past 30 years have created an 
increasingly competitive market where students have a large number of 
institutions/degree courses to choose from and institutions compete to attract students. 
This thesis investigates the factors that could potentially influence students’ decision to 
invest in higher education and their choice of universities.  
The second chapter investigates how university league tables affect prospective 
students’ application decisions. The results suggest a one standard deviation change in 
the subject-level ranking score of an institution is associated with a 4.3% increase in 
application numbers per faculty. This effect is particularly pronounced among 
institutions with the best scores, and it has grown stronger over time.  
The third chapter analyses whether the sharp increase in tuition fees in 2012 for home 
(UK) and EU students have changed their expected earnings after graduation. Thus it 
indirectly assesses whether the increased fees have increased their demand for 
information on the returns to higher education and made them more aware of the 
labour market for university graduates. The results suggest while the increased tuition 
fees have no impact on students’ expected starting salary, home and EU students that 
entered university in or after 2012 have lowered their expected return to higher 
education. 
The fourth chapter studies the price sensitivity of non-EU students to changes in 
overseas tuition fees. After controlling for institutional quality and endogeneity of fees, 
we find that overall, overseas students do not react negatively to changes in fees, and 
better ranked institutions and institutions with more home/UK students attracts more 
students from outside the Europe. 
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1. Introduction 
A series of reforms over the past 30 years have led to a number of changes in the 
UK higher education sector. The higher education participation rate and the number of 
overseas students studying at UK universities have both increased substantially during 
this period. During the same period, the government has been gradually shifting the 
burden of funding for higher education from the public to the private sector. As such, 
institutions are under more pressure than before to compete with each other to attract 
students. With this in mind, this thesis investigates the factors that could potentially 
influence students’ decision to invest in higher education and their choice of universities.  
Using application data across UK universities over a period of 8 years, the second 
chapter investigates how league tables affect prospective students’ application 
decisions. We use subject specific ranking rather than the commonly used institution 
level ranking. We find that a one standard deviation change in the subject-level ranking 
score of an institution is associated with on average a 4.3% increase in application 
numbers per faculty. This effect is particularly pronounced among faculties with the best 
scores, and overseas applicants. Limits to the number of choices per applicant have 
increased the preponderance of league tables.  This chapter contributes to the literature 
in three distinct ways. First, we conduct our analysis at the subject level (as opposed to 
institution-level classifications), as we believe students’ application decisions are 
primarily bound by  institutions’ provision of the subject they intend to study, and 
heterogeneity in the quality across subjects within an institution could underestimate 
the true impact of league tables on applications. Second, we investigate whether the 
demand for information on quality changes, when the institution framework changes 
(tuition fees, and the number of choices allowed per applicant). Third, we test for 
heterogeneity in the impact of league tables by focusing on different types of applicants. 
The findings of this chapter could be particularly relevant considering that recently the 
cap on the number of UK and EU student at English universities have been fully lifted 
and income effect of rankings could go up. The findings here call for institution 
participation in monitoring and improving the data and methodology used by league 
table compilers.   
Using surveys handed out to first-year undergraduate Economics students at a 
British University, the third chapter analyses whether the sharp increase in tuition fees 
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in 2012 for home (UK) and EU students have changed their expected earnings after 
graduation. Thus this chapter contributes to previous literature by indirectly assessing 
whether the increased fees have increased their demand for information on the returns 
to higher education and made them more aware of the labour market for university 
graduates. The results suggest that while the increased tuition fees have no impact on 
students’ expected starting salary, home and EU students that entered university in or 
after 2012 have lowered their expected return to higher education on average by about 
30 percentage points, bringing it closer to the realised returns shown in previous 
literature. The reduction in students’ expected wage growth/premium shown in this 
chapter contradicts earlier findings of the progressive nature of the 2012 reforms, and 
could imply that some students made their decisions of not investing in higher education 
from inaccurate or incomplete information. Therefore, this chapter calls for government 
intervention to provide prospective students with clear and accessible information on 
the real cost of higher education, and the fact of substantial life time earning premium 
for university graduates.  
Using UK data on first-year undergraduate students and university tuition fees, the 
fourth chapter builds a panel of all incoming undergraduate students by country of 
origin to study the price sensitivity of non-EU students to changes in overseas tuition 
fees. Unlike previous literature, this chapter focuses on application decisions of overseas 
students after they have already decided to pursue higher education in the UK. After 
controlling for institutional quality and the endogeneity of fees, we find that overall, 
overseas students do not react negatively to changes in fees, but better ranked 
institutions and institutions with more home/UK students attract more students from 
outside the Europe. Previous analysis have shown that overseas students bring 
substantial benefits to the British economy, and given their relatively inelastic demand 
for British higher education, the findings here call for more relaxed immigration policies 
towards overseas students. 
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2. Subject Specific League Tables and Students’ Application 
Decisions 
2.1 Introduction 
Higher education is an experience good for which it may a-priori be difficult to evaluate 
its quality, especially when it varies both between but also within provider; i.e. quality 
might be subject specific. Since higher education quality has been linked to future higher 
earnings for graduates in the UK (Chevalier, 2014), there should be a strong demand 
from applicants for private third party evaluation of the said quality. Indeed a number 
of British media publish university league tables1 every summer to help prospective 
students; each of these differ slightly in terms of methodology but all attempt to 
approximate the quality of degree courses based on a set of objective criteria.  
The onus of a league table is to provide information on ‘quality’ that prospective 
students find useful when making their decisions about where to apply. While some in 
the sector view league tables as a limited and somewhat noisy signal of quality (HEFCE, 
2008), previous research found that an improvement in the rankings is associated with 
an increase in the number of applications received (Sauder and Lancaster, 2006; 
Bowman and Bastedo, 2009; Soo and Elliott, 2010; Broecke, 2012), highlighting their 
importance to prospective students. However, the literature relies either on 
institutional-level rankings or a limited group of subjects. These may thus be biased if 
there is heterogeneity in the quality of different subjects within an institution.  
This chapter contributes to the literature in three distinct ways. First, we estimate 
the elasticity of demand for higher education at the subject level and not at the 
institution level2 and compare estimates of the ranking effect on applications when 
`quality’ is measured at the institution level and the subject level. 
Second, we investigate whether the relevance of information on degree programme 
quality changes when the institutional framework changes. In particular we examine 
two important changes: i) the 2004 Higher Education Act amended the financing of 
higher education in England and lifted the maximum tuition fees for home and EU 
                                                          
1 The Times university rankings were first published in 1992, the Sunday Times introduced theirs in 1998, 
the Guardian followed in 1999 and the Complete University Guide (the Independent) in 2007. 
2 A recent manuscript by Gibbons et al (2014) also uses subject level information but relies on the National 
Student Survey, a national survey of undergraduate finalists, to approximate quality. This measure 
obviously correlates with league table scores since it is used as one of the input in producing them. 
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students from 2006 onwards, ii) starting from 2008, the maximum number of choices 
(university/degree programme) per applicant was reduced from 6 to 5. Both events 
should increase the demand for information on quality and thus the demand elasticity 
with respect to league table.   
Third, we test for heterogeneity in the impact of league tables by focusing on 
different types of applicants. In particular, since the UK is one of the main destinations 
for international students we test whether overseas applicants have a greater demand 
for information as they have more limited knowledge of the UK higher education sector.  
Since applicants’ decisions are primarily bound by their preferences for the subject 
they intend to study (Roberts and Thompson, 2007; HEFCE, 2008), we collected data on 
application numbers at the subject (group) level ((Joint Academic Coding System, JACS) 
for each British higher education institution for the period 2004 to 2011, from the 
Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS). UCAS centralises all applications to 
undergraduate courses, as such we observe the universe of applications, apart from 
prospective students applying through clearing. In some of our models, we disaggregate 
this data by geographic origin (home, EU, non-EU) and/or gender of applicants. We 
match this data on number of applications to subject specific league tables. We rely on 
the most popular league table, provided free of charge by the Guardian newspaper3. We 
then use fixed effect models, where the identification comes from variations in the 
subject (group) ranking score over the years, and estimate that when an institution’s 
subject (group) ranking score improves by one standard deviation, degree application 
numbers increase on average by 4.3%. There is also heterogeneity by institutional 
regime (reducing the maximum number of choices per candidate increased this 
elasticity), by origin (non-UK domiciled applicants are more responsive to changes in the 
ranking score), by subject groups (Arts applicants are less responsive) and by initial 
position (larger for institutions with higher ranking scores). We also report that 
estimates of the elasticity of demand with regards to quality are biased when quality is 
                                                          
3 Circulation figures of The Guardian online edition show it surpasses both The Times and The Sunday 
Times, and according to figures released by the newspaper, its annual university guides  attract 370,000 
users (online) a month.  
See http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2010/09/13/UniversityGuide.pdf, and 
February 2010 circulation figures for Guardian newspaper online edition. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8588432.stm.   
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measured at the institutional level. The results are robust to various specifications of 
time and quality measures. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature on 
the influence of university league tables on higher education demand. Section 2.3 details 
the institutional set-up of higher education in the UK and describes the data. Section 2.4 
presents the model and research method, and section 2.5 details our findings. Section 
2.6 provides the conclusion.  
 
2.2 Literature review 
The literature on university rankings mostly originates from the U.S. and the U.K.. 
Monks and Ehrenberg (1999), Sauder and Lancaster (2006), Griffith and Rask (2007), 
Bowman and Bastedo (2009), Luca and Smith (2013) studied the effect of the U.S. News 
and World Report Rankings (USNWR) on students’ application decisions and institutions’ 
admission behaviours. The USNWR divides American universities and liberal arts 
colleges into four tiers; institutions in the top tier are ranked, the remaining institutions 
are listed alphabetically per tiers. This literature has generally concluded that 
improvements in the ranking are associated with increased number of applications, 
increased selectivity and increased conversion of accepted applications (Monks and 
Ehrenberg, [1999], Sauder and Lancaster [2006]). Bowman and Bastedo (2009) showed 
that institutions moving into the top tier of the USNWR see a 3.9% increase in the 
number of applications received, and an increase of 1.2 point in incoming students’ 
average SAT scores. Using individual-level applicant data, Griffith and Rask (2007) 
analysed the effect of USNWR on students’ enrolment decisions and report that an 
institution ranked in the top 20 will see a 0.45% change in accepted students’ probability 
of enrolment for each one unit change in rank. Using application data to the top 50 
universities, Luca and Smith (2013) estimated the impact of USNWR rankings from 
changes in the ranking methodology, i.e., institutions’ rank changed without any change 
in underlying quality. They find that a one unit improvement in rank leads to one 
percentage point increase in the number of applications. To summarise the US findings, 
the USNWR rankings affects top-tier institutions the most, with the most responsive 
students being the most able.  
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For the UK, Broecke (2012) used individual-level data for home applicants and a set 
of different ranking providers, and found that on average an institution experiences a 
fall of 100 applications for each 10 places it drops in a league table. His findings also 
suggest heterogeneity in the impact of rankings across applicants; with male, young, 
Asian, high-achievers, higher socio-economic classes, and privately educated applicants 
being more responsive. Using student satisfaction scores published in the National 
Student Survey (NSS) and the Times university rankings as measures of quality, Gibbons 
et al. (2013) find that a 10 percentage points increase in NSS score leads to a 2.3% 
increase in applications, whereas a 10-percentile improvement in the Times (subject-
level) ranking score increases the number of applications by 1.5 to 2%. However, they 
find that NSS score affects applications via its impact on universities’ league table 
positions. In addition, they also find that changes in Times (subject-level) rankings 
matters more to better ranked institutions.   
While most previous studies have relied on static panel and fixed effect models, Soo 
(2013), used dynamic panel data analysis, and found that changes in the Sunday Times 
overall rankings as well as changes in entry requirements have no significant impact on 
application numbers but found strong inertia in application numbers. Soo and Elliott 
(2010), like us, investigates subject specific rankings but only for overseas students in 
two subject areas: Business and Engineering. From this limited unrepresentative 
population, they found that overseas Business application numbers vary between 0.5% 
to 0.9% for a one unit change in subject rank. We expand this work by looking at all 
subject and applicant groups. 
2.3 Institutional set-up and Data 
2.3.1 Institutional set-up 
Higher education reforms since the mid-eighties, particularly after the 1987 White 
Paper and the 1992 Further and Higher education Act, have created an increasingly 
competitive market for higher education in the UK. Applicants have a large number of 
institutions/degree courses to choose from, and institutions compete to attract them. 
As participation to higher education increased throughout the nineties, the model of 
public financing of higher education became un-sustainable; income per undergraduate 
student dropped from £8,000 in 1980s to £4,850 in 1997 (Dearden et al., 2011). To limit 
the burden of higher education on public finances and improve funding, maintenance 
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grants were abolished and an up-front fee of £1000 was applied to new undergraduate 
students from 1998 onwards. In 2004, a new round of funding reforms were announced 
replacing up-front tuition fees with a tuition fee of up to £3000 payable from an income-
contingent loan (Higher Education Act, 2004)4. The tuition fee reforms differ somewhat 
in Wales and Scotland. Tuition fees went up to £3000 in Wales in 2007 but Welsh 
students studying at Welsh institutions benefited from a grant of around £2000 towards 
their tuition fees till 20105. Scottish students studying in Scotland benefited from free 
education but had to pay an end of study endowment of £2,000 up to 20076. Institutions 
in Northern Ireland followed the same institutional framework as English institutions 
during the period of interest. These differences in fee regimes will be mostly captured 
by institution specific time trends and our results are robust to restricting the sample to 
English institutions only7. 
For the period of interest, universities received payments from the central 
government via the Higher Education Funding Councils, based on their number of home 
and EU students. This funding was fixed by the government, implicitly fixing the number 
of home and EU students by institutions. The maximum tuition fees that institutions can 
charge were also fixed. As such, to increase funding, institutions have over time 
expanded their programmes to overseas students for which numbers and tuition fees 
are not capped. As a result, the number of overseas students studying at UK universities 
almost tripled between 1994/95 and 2009/10 (Universities UK, 2011). Having less prior 
information on degree programmes at UK universities and paying higher fees, it is 
possible that they are more reliant on league tables as an indicator of quality. We note 
that during the period of interest, British universities are under student number controls 
over how many UK and European students they can recruit such that they will be 
penalised for over- or under-shooting the target. Hence expanding the intake of 
                                                          
4 Further funding reforms were implemented in 2012 which increased the tuition fees cap to £9,000, but 
this does not directly affect the cohorts investigated here. 
5 For Wales, http://www.studentfinancewales.co.uk/continuing-students/201415-what-financial-support-
is-available/tuition-fee-support.aspx#.VMz7Y2Byb4g, and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-
11515828,  
6 Scottish Parliament Information Centre Briefing on Graduate Endowment,  
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S3/SB_07-54.pdf  
7 The data does not allow us to distinguish applicants from the 4 constituent countries of the UK, but there 
is little mobility across the Scottish border apart from students from Northern Ireland. 
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overseas students do not imply that an equal number of UK/European students will be 
stripped of their places at university.   
For full time undergraduate degrees, the U.K. university application process is 
centralised. Prospective students apply via the Universities and Colleges Admissions 
Service (UCAS), which passes their applications to universities for them to decide 
whether an offer is made. Until 2007, each applicant, regardless of domicile was allowed 
a maximum of six programme choices (institution-subject). This was reduced to five in 
20088. As such we can define three regimes: top-up fees and 6 applications until 2005, 
tuition fees and 6 applications in 2006 and 2007, and tuition fees and 5 applications 
since 2008. 
2.3.2 Data 
The data originate from two main sources: the UCAS annual report which provides 
aggregate level data on application numbers 9  by institutions, JACS (Joint Academic 
Coding Systems) subject groups and student origin and gender, and the Guardian 
subject-level rankings across more than 40 different academic disciplines10. We only 
keep applications to full time undergraduate degrees for the years 2004 to 2011. Figure 
2.1 presents the trends in the number of applications submitted every year from 2004 
to 2011, by applicants’ geographic origins. Overall, applications have increased 
throughout the period of interest to reach 2.4 million, with the rise being the steepest 
for students originating from the EU. The two dips in the overall number of applications 
coincide with the increase in tuition fees from £1000 to £3000 in 2006 and the change 
in UCAS application system in 2008 which saw the number of choices per applicant 
reduced from 6 to 5. The trends by origin of applicants are fairly similar, even if the levels 
are very different. 
                                                          
8 Applicants to Oxford or Cambridge universities can only apply to one of the two institutions, not both, 
and are further restricted to four choices only. Applicants to medical schools and veterinary schools are 
also limited to four choices. These applications must be completed by the autumn preceding entrance to 
higher education.  
9 The data excludes clearing applications since those are not centralised via UCAS. 
10 These were obtained from the education section of the Guardian website with the exception of the 2009 
ranking which we took from the printed edition of the Guardian University Guide. We have not been able 
to track down the Guardian data before 2003. (2004 rankings were published in 2003).  
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Figure 2.1: Number of degree applications by geographic origin: years 2004-2011 (in thousands)
 
Source: UCAS application data, 2004-2011 
Note: graph based on the total number of degree applications submitted every year, which is 
the sum of all the choices applicants made on their application forms in that year.  
 
Although recent surveys suggest an increasing number of prospective students refer 
to league tables before making their decisions (Roberts and Thompson, 2007; HEFCE, 
2008), such league tables have attracted much criticism about their accuracy and 
reliability. The main gripe with league tables is that the methodology employed changes 
over time and hence they do not capture changes to the true quality of programmes 
(HEFCE, 2008). For this chapter, we do not take side in this debate regarding the merit 
of methodologies used to construct league tables but only use them as a source of 
information available to prospective students. Gunn and Hill (2008) find high and 
significant level of correlation between league tables across different publishers (the 
Telegraph, the Financial Times, the Guardian, the Sunday Times and the Times). Our 
choice of the Guardian league tables to conduct this research is no endorsement that it 
provides a more accurate measure of educational quality, but only reflects that it is 
easily accessible and currently the most popular ranking (see footnote 3).  
0
50
100
150
200
250
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
EU (ex UK) and 
Non EU 
applications
Overall and UK 
applications
Overall applications UK EU (ex UK) Non EU
17 
 
Over the period 2004 to 2011, the list of subjects covered by the Guardian league 
tables changed somehow. When subjects were merged, we take the average score 
across the two subjects in the years that they were treated independently to create a 
consistent series. These subject tables were then collapsed further to form new league 
tables based on the list of JACS subject groups used by UCAS, details of which is provided 
in Appendix table A3.  
The methodology behind the Guardian league tables has also changed over time 
(see table A1 in Appendix). The most recent set of criteria used to construct them 
includes expenditure per student, student staff ratio, job prospects, value added, entry 
tariff, course satisfaction (from the annual National Student Survey (NSS)), teaching 
quality (from NSS), and feedback (from NSS). Compare to most of the literature we use 
ranking scores rather than ranks since each subject (group) has different numbers of 
institutions offering them, making rank comparisons between subjects meaningless. The 
National Student Survey became an input in the ranking score in 2008 and brought 
substantial changes to the set of criteria used, which then led to noticeable changes in 
the mean subject (group)-level ranking scores11. With this in mind, we standardised the 
subject (group)-level Guardian ranking score by year and subject groups in all of the 
regressions, to make the mean value consistent throughout the period.  
The Guardian does not rank all UK higher education providers but has a focus on 
institutions catering for full time undergraduate education. It also omits institutions 
which decline to provide the full set of information and courses with less than 35 full-
time equivalent students. Finally, there were some consolidations of the higher 
education sector over the period; in such cases, we treat the institutions as separate 
before the merger and as a new institution afterwards12. We then merge the UCAS 
application numbers and Guardian league table information taking care that 
information on league tables published in year t (and named Guardian ranking year t+1) 
is linked to applications in year t+1. The final data is an unbalanced panel with gaps; 
there are 162 institutions across 8 years, and 17 subject groups in total, which give us a 
sample of 10,753 observations. The number of institutions per subject group in each 
                                                          
11 We attempted to use change in methodology as an exogenous shock to ranking, independently of true 
quality. To do so, we replicated the 2008 rankings using the 2007 methods. Unfortunately, the information 
publicly provided does not allow to replicate grading scores or ranking. 
12 Institutions that changed name are recoded as the same institution throughout. 
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year is available in Appendix table A2. Table 2.1 contains the summary statistics of the 
main time-varying variables (raw data, not standardised) at various level of dis-
aggregation, and shows that faculties receive on average 1,400 applications, 17% of 
which are from foreign applicants (EU and Non EU).  
Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
Number of applications (institutional level) 16744.72 2343.73 10753 
Number of applications (faculty/subject-group level) 1389.52 354.00 10753 
By applicants' domiciles UK 1178.42 309.09 10726 
 EU (excl. UK) 95.41 48.61 9706 
 Non EU 142.71 61.10 9641 
By gender                               Male 705.22 157.73 9532 
                                                 Female 812.63 246.53 9840 
Guardian (subject group-level) ranking score  62.84 8.19 10753 
Note: Source: Guardian university guides and UCAS application data, 2004 – 2011. Cells report the 
average application numbers for institutions with available institution/subject-level ranking 
information (more specifically, there are 127 institutions with available institution-level ranking 
information, and 162 institutions with available subject group-level ranking information).  
 
 
2.4 Model 
We estimate whether the number of applications to a given subject-group (i) at a 
given institution (u) in period (t), yiut is a function of the subject group-level Guardian 
ranking score/ranks (xiut). The main equation depicting the relationship is 
log(yiut)= β1Xiut + αi + δiu + f(Tt) + εiut               (1) 
where: αi is the subject fixed effect, δiu is the faculty fixed effect, where faculty refers to 
subject group i at institution u, f(Tt) is a function of time that includes either year 
dummies, a linear trend or institution specific trends. Dummies reflecting institutional 
environment (fees regime and maximum number of choices regime) were also added in 
some specifications, and εiut is the random error term. The main coefficient of interest 
to be estimated, β1, represents the percentage change in the number of applications 
associated with a one standard deviation change in the ranking score Xiut (about 8 points 
in the ranking score). 
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Any correlation between the ranking score and unobserved variables (such as 
reputation of the faculty, location of the university, etc.) is assumed constant over time 
and accounted for by the faculty-level fixed effect13. Standard errors are clustered at the 
institutional level to control for within-institution correlations14. The model is identified 
by changes in the ranking score for a given faculty over time, as such it is crucial to assess 
that there is enough within faculty variation. This is explored in Figure 2.2 which plots 
for each institution/subject pair the mean and standard deviation in Guardian ranking 
score. The average variation is around 8 points with a few outliers, as such subject (group) 
specific scores appear to vary substantially over time.  
Figure 2.2: Variation in Guardian ranking score over time (per faculty/institution-subject group)  
 
Source: The Guardian University Guides 2004 – 2011  
Note: Lowess fit is a non-parametric fit of the data using locally weighted linear regressions. 
 
                                                          
13 We use the Hausman test to verify the appropriateness of the specification and the result shows the null 
hypothesis of no systematic difference between fixed and random effects estimates is rejected, which 
confirms fixed effects is preferred as the consistent estimator to be used here. 
14 Clustering at the faculty/institution level produces similar standard errors.   
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2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Main results. 
In Table 2.2 we present results using different treatment of the time effect. The first 
column uses year dummies to account for year-on-year changes in the number of 
applications. We estimate that when the subject group-level Guardian ranking score 
improves by one standard deviation, the number of applications received increases by 
4.2%. In the second column, we reduce the flexibility of the model by imposing a linear 
time trend and dummy variables for years under different tuition fees regime and 
maximum number of choices allowed. The fee increase and the cap on number of 
choices reduced the total number of applications by 14% and 21% respectively, but the 
coefficient estimate for the score variable remains the same. In column 3, we estimate 
the fully flexible model specified above and include institution specific linear trends. An 
F-test of equality of the time trends between institutions is rejected, confirming that 
models using only faculties and year fixed effects are biased, as such this is our preferred 
specification. Note that the adjusted R-square also doubles when this specification is 
used. The estimates are extremely stable to the treatment of the time effect and range 
from 4.2% to 4.3% change in application numbers for a one standard deviation change 
in Guardian ranking score15.  
Table 2.2: Fixed effects model - Guardian (subject group level) ranking score and log 
applications numbers 
 ln (applications by faculty) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
        
ranking score (standardised) 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
year dummies x   
linear trend  x x 
post top-up fees  x x 
5 choices per applicant max  x x 
institution specific trends   x 
Constant 6.639*** 6.546*** 6.546*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.005) 
    
Observations 10,753 10,753 10,753 
Number of groups 1,554 1,554 1,554 
Adjusted R-squared 0.124 0.120 0.207 
                                                          
15 The estimated results are robust to the inclusion of a quadratic term of ranking score. The estimated 
result marginally increases to 4.5% change in applications, for a one standard deviation change in the 
ranking score, while the coefficient on the quadratic term (ranking score) is never statistically significant. 
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F test for institution specific trends - - 1923.60 
(p-value)   (0.0000) 
Note: Source: Guardian university guides and UCAS application data, 2004 – 2011. 
“Number of groups” refers to observations by institution and subject groups. Degrees of 
freedom for the F test are (3, 161). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 
the institution level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We then test whether the effect of ranking score on applications has changed over 
time, especially following the aforementioned institutional reforms, tuition fee increase 
and restriction on application choices, which should have increased the demand for 
information about course quality. We thus interact the ranking score with a dummy for 
the higher fee regimes (post-2006) and with a restricted choice dummy (post-2008). 
Results are presented in Table 2.3 column 1. Only the interaction of score with the 
reduction in the number of choices per candidate is significant and positive, increasing 
the elasticity of application with respect to quality by 2 percentage points16. In the 
second column, we report estimates for an even more flexible model, using year 
dummies and their interactions with the ranking score, with 2004 used as the baseline 
year. These interactions overall are statistically significant as shown by the F-test, and 
confirm that the demand for quality information sharply increased in the two years 
following the reduction in the number of choices allowed before going back to trend. 
Overall the evidence appears consistent with our assumption that in the short-run the 
demand for information grew when the returns to information increased. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 Additionally, we tested incorporating each interaction separately to the model, the effects are then larger, 
and the change in fees interactions becomes marginally significant. A three-way interaction of fee increase, 
ranking score and limit on choices again reveals positive but not statistically significant results and the 
three ways interactions terms are not substantially different from those presented. 
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Table 2.3: Heterogeneity in the effect of Guardian (subject group level) ranking score by 
institutional regime and applicants’ type. 
  
ln (applications by faculty)        ln (applications by faculty 
and applicant group) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)         (4) 
      
ranking score (standardised) 0.032** 0.023 0.018* 0.050*** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.009) (0.008) 
ranking score x post top-up fees 0.0024    
 (0.013)    
post top-up fees -0.135***  -0.174*** -0.174*** 
 (0.017)  (0.015) (0.015) 
ranking score x 5 choices 0.024**    
 (0.010)    
5 choices per applicant -0.215***  -0.262*** -0.262*** 
 (0.013)  (0.014) (0.014) 
2005 x ranking score  0.020   
  (0.017)   
2006 x ranking score  0.002   
  (0.016)   
2007 x ranking score  0.023   
  (0.018)   
2008 x ranking score  0.047***   
  (0.018)   
2009 x ranking score  0.043**   
  (0.020)   
2010 x ranking score  0.025   
  (0.022)   
2011 x ranking score  0.022   
  (0.025)   
EU (ex UK) x ranking score    0.040***  
   (0.014)  
Non EU x ranking score    0.056***  
   (0.013)  
female x ranking score     -0.003 
    (0.006) 
Institution specific trends x x x x 
Constant 6.546*** 6.593*** 3.709*** 3.710*** 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) 
     
Observations 10,753 10,753 61,500 61,500 
Number of groups 1,554 1,554 9,126 9,126 
Adjusted R2 0.208 0.212 0.128 0.127 
     
F test for: year  x ranking score - 2.66 - - 
(p-value)  (0.012)   
Chow test for: domicile x 
ranking score - - 11.93 - 
(p-value)   (0.0000)  
Note: Source: Guardian university guides and UCAS application data, 2004 – 2011. "Number of groups" 
refers to observations by institution and subject groups (and domicile and gender in column (3) and 
column (4)). 2004 is the baseline year in column (2).  Controls for applicants' domiciles (UK, EU(ex UK), 
Non EU) and gender are included in column (3) and column (4). The degrees of freedom for the F-test 
are (7, 161). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at institution level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
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We then turn to assessing heterogeneity in the impact of ranking score for 
applicants of different geographic origins (domiciles) and gender. Non-UK students 
typically have less a-priori knowledge about the quality of various institutions, so one 
may expect them to be more reliant on external information, as published in various 
university guides, and consequently be more sensitive to changes in the ranking scores. 
In addition, while EU students pay the same fees as home students, those from outside 
the EU are not publicly subsidised and face uncapped tuition fees (typically around 
£10,000 for this period), which should also make them more sensitive to changes in 
‘quality’. We split the applicant cells by the geographical origin of applicants, and 
interact the standardised ranking score with applicants’ domiciles (Column 3)17. The 
results confirm that changes in the ranking score have a disproportional effect on non-
UK students. While a one standard deviation change in the ranking score marginally 
increases the number of British applications by 1.8%, for EU and non-EU applications 
this stands at 5.8% and 7.4% respectively. Overseas applicants are 4 times more 
sensitive to change in quality information which could reflect the higher costs of 
education or their lack of initial information. These differences in the effect of ranking 
score on applications by applicants origin are large and significantly different from each 
other (Chow test F=11.93). 
Finally, we test whether there is any heterogeneity in the response to quality 
information changes by gender. To do so, we split the applicant cells by gender and 
include an interaction term of ranking score and gender. The last column in Table 2.3 
reports results from this model which reveals no significant difference in application 
behaviour by gender.  
In Table 2.4, we assess whether the impact of ranking score differs for applicants to 
different subject groups. For doing so, we interact each subject group with the 
standardised ranking score. We find little difference in the responsiveness of 
prospective students to quality score across subject groups. The only exception being 
Creative Arts & Design, which has a slightly different application process, whereby 
applicants provide a portfolio demonstrating their artistic competence. As such, they 
probably gather information about the quality of the institutions at this stage. 
Alternatively, they might have strong preferences for being taught in a given university 
                                                          
17 Conclusions are similar if the analysis is run for each group separately. 
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where the faculty better match their artistic interest, which could make them less 
sensitive to changes in ranking scores.  
Table 2.4: Heterogeneity in the effect of Guardian (subject group level) ranking score by 
subject and number of institutions 
VARIABLES                        ln (applications per faculty) 
ranking score (standardised) 0.044* 0.093** 
 (0.024) (0.038) 
Group A Medicine & Dentistry x ranking score -0.023  
 (0.031)  
Group B Subjects allied to Medicine x ranking score -0.047  
 (0.032)  
Group C Biological Sciences x ranking score -0.018  
 (0.025)  
Group D Vet Sci, Ag & related x ranking score -0.086  
 (0.065)  
Group F Physical Sciences x ranking score -0.006  
 (0.036)  
Group G Mathematical & Comp Sci x ranking score 0.013  
 (0.030)  
Group H Engineering x ranking score -0.000  
 (0.033)  
Group J Technologies x ranking score -0.012  
 (0.080)  
Group K Architecture, Build & Plan x ranking score 0.067  
 (0.055)  
Group M Law x ranking score 0.035  
 (0.031)  
Group N Business & Admin studies x ranking score 0.029  
 (0.031)  
Group P Mass Comms  x ranking score 0.021  
 (0.040)  
Group Q Languages and Linguistics x ranking score -0.021  
 (0.029)  
Group V Hist & Philosophical studies x ranking score 0.014  
 (0.031)  
Group W Creative Arts & Design x ranking score -0.068*  
 (0.036)  
Group X Education x ranking score  0.074  
 (0.073)  
number of institutions (per subject group) /100  0.005 
  (0.157) 
ranking score x number of institutions / 100  -0.054 
  (0.037) 
post top-up fees x x 
5 choices per application max x x 
institution specific trends x x 
Constant 6.546*** 6.542*** 
 (0.005) (0.145) 
Observations 10,753 10,753 
Number of groups 1,554 1,554 
Adjusted R-squared 0. 210 0.207 
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F test of Subject Groups x ranking score 1.79 - 
(p-value) (0.0363)  
Note: Source: Guardian university league guides and UCAS application data, 2004 – 2011. "Group L Social 
Sciences" is the baseline group in column (1). "Number of groups" refers to observations by institution and 
subject groups. Degrees of freedom for the F test in column 1 are (16,161). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, clustered at university level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Finally, we test whether information on educational quality is more valuable when 
there are more HE providers to choose from in a subject area. For doing so, the 
standardised ranking score is interacted with the number of institutions offering the 
subject (group). The second column of Table 2.4 reports these estimates. We can reject 
this hypothesis since the number of institutions reported in a subject (group)-specific 
league table does not affect the impact of the ranking score. Perhaps this is not entirely 
surprising, since the subject groups used in this analysis are quite broad and the model 
includes subject fixed effects, as such the effect on number of institutions is identified 
from changes in the number of providers per subject group, which does not vary 
substantially from year to year. 
Finally, we assess possible non-linearity in the relationship between ranking score 
and application numbers. More talented applicants who typically apply to better ranked 
institutions may be more sensitive to information that suggests change in `quality’ of 
those institutions. Figure 2.3 shows estimates of the quality effect at each decile of the 
ranking score distribution. There is some evidence of non-linearity. The effect of a score 
improvement is greater for faculties in the top three deciles, and especially for the top 
one. Like previous U.S. and British studies have shown for institution quality, the impact 
of information on course quality is non-linear and increases at the top, this is also true 
when quality is measured at the subject level. 
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Figure 2.3: Effect of a change in the (standardised) Guardian ranking score at different points 
(deciles) of the score distribution 
 
Data Source: The Guardian University Guides and UCAS application data 2004-2011 
Note: Graph based on the regression of log (applications) on (dummies of) each decile of the 
Guardian ranking score.    
Overall, it appears that the reaction to a change in quality information is broadly 
similar between applicants of different subject groups (with the exceptions of Creative 
Arts & Design) and gender, and that the only heterogeneity originates from applicants’ 
geographical origin, whereby applicants with the least a-priori knowledge of British 
institutions and paying higher fees are more sensitive to quality information. The effects 
are also much stronger for faculties moving to the top deciles of the quality distribution. 
2.5.2 Robustness checks 
In this section, we conduct various robustness checks of our specification (Table 2.5). 
First, we assess whether the results are sensitive to the use of rank rather than ranking 
score. The reason for focusing on ranking score is that rank is difficult to interpret when 
the number of Higher Education providers differs between subject groups. To compare 
with the rest of the literature we re-run our favoured specification using subject (group) 
rank as the independent variable, and estimate that a one unit changes in rank is 
associated with a 0.1% change in application numbers (Column 1). The estimated results 
are rather small compared to Soo and Elliott (2010) which may be driven by their focus 
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on overseas applicants only, a group that has a greater elasticity to quality information.  
To attenuate our concerns that rank is sensitive to the number of competitors, we 
change the dependent variable to market share in a specific subject group, i.e. we 
implicitly control for the number of competitors (Column 2). This has little effect on the 
size of the estimated coefficient.  
To interpret the size of the coefficients on rank in terms of the number of 
applications, we find that a 10-place change in rank, for an institution with on average 
11 subject groups, will lead to a fall of 183 applications on average. This is significantly 
higher than Boecke (2012), where a 10 place change in rank is associated with a drop of 
100 applications, and is consistent with the hypothesis that institutional level analysis 
on the impact of rankings could be biased due to the fact that they do not account for 
heterogeneity in the quality of different subjects an institution offers. To further test 
whether applicants put more weight to the subject or institution-level ranking score, we 
include both in the model. The results confirm that applicants are more focused on the 
subject specific quality information (Column3, Column 4). A one unit increase in rank 
(moving down a league table) has a 25% larger effect on number of applications when 
quality is measured at the faculty rather than the institution level. This jumps to 50% 
when ranking score rather than rank is used as a measure of quality. This is consistent 
with the findings of Roberts and Thompson (2007) that applicants are mostly focused 
on subjects rather than institutions. As such, previous research has largely 
underestimated the effect of quality information on the decision of applicants. 
Finally, as detailed in the institutional set-up, Welsh and Scottish institutions 
adopted different tuition fees regimes compare to their English counterparts during the 
period of interest. We re-run our favoured specification using English institutions only 
(Column 5). The estimated coefficient remains very stable and marginally increases to 
4.5%, for a one standard deviation change in ranking score.   
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Table 2.5 Fixed effect model: subject group/institution rankings and application numbers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
ln 
(applications 
by faculty) 
ln (market 
share – 
by faculty) 
ln 
(applications 
by faculty) 
ln 
(applications 
by faculty) 
ln (applications 
by faculty) 
England only 
            
subject group rank -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0010***   
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)   
subject group ranking score    0.0380*** 0.0450*** 
    (0.0090) (0.0099) 
institution rank   -0.0008*   
   (0.0004)   
institution ranking score     0.0253*  
    (0.0144)  
trend x x x x x 
post top-up fees x x x x x 
5 choices per applicant x x x x x 
institution specific trends x x x x x 
Constant 6.602*** -4.891*** 6.646*** 6.553*** 6.593*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0124) (0.0262) (0.0044) (0.0053) 
      
Observations 10,753 10,753 10,434 10,434 8,580 
Number of groups 1,554 1,554 1,491 1,491 1,222 
Adjusted R-squared 0.204 0.108 0.199 0.201 0.211 
Note: Source: Guardian university league guides and UCAS application data, 2004 – 2011.  “Market share” is 
the share of applications received by each institution per year, among all the institutions that appear in the same 
subject group. “Number of groups” refers to observations by institution and subject groups. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses, clustered at institution level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
29 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Do prospective students care about league Tables? Using data from the UK which 
allow us to observe all applications and detailed information on ranking scores at the 
subject level, we find that a one standard deviation improvement in the subject-level 
ranking score increases the number of applications by 4.3% in our favoured specification. 
The underlying information of the ranking score became more important, as the 
maximum number of choices allowed per applicant was curtailed, and for better ranked 
faculties. This is consistent with previous findings that change in quality matters 
especially at the top. We find weak evidence of heterogeneity by subject groups but 
noticeable differences by prospective students’ geographic origin. Non-British 
applicants, especially those paying the highest tuition fees, are four times more sensitive 
to information on the quality of the higher education. Finally, previous research, by 
focusing on institution level ranking, has underestimated the effect of league tables on 
applications; applicants are 50% more sensitive to information at the faculty level than 
at the university level.  
Should institution care about their ranking? We now conduct some back of the 
envelope calculations to assess the size of the reported effects for an average institution. 
For the period covered in the data, numbers of home and EU students at each university 
were controlled and the only free market was for overseas students (assuming no visa 
restriction). An improvement in the Guardian ranking score of one standard deviation 
would lead to a 7.4% change in overseas applications, or 10.5 additional applications 
from overseas students per faculty, at the mean. With a conversion rate of 17% 
(computed from UCAS report), this loosely translates to an additional two students 
enrolled and £20,000 additional revenue per subject group, which does not appear very 
substantial. Taking our overall estimates, the average 4.3% change in applications for a 
one standard deviation improvement in Guardian ranking score represents an additional 
60 applications received per faculty. Given the current level of tuition fees and a 
conversion rate of applications to students of 20%, this loosely translates into a change 
in income of £108,000 for each subject group per year or £1,188,000 per institution, on 
average, or roughly a 0.7% increase in income18. The direct immediate impact on an 
institution’s budget from variation in Guardian ranking score thus appears quite limited. 
                                                          
18 The average institutional income is £168 million in the 2010/11 academic year (HESA). 
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However, recent reforms have fully lifted the caps on number of home and EU students 
English universities can recruit19, and the income effect of league tables could increase 
when institutions are no longer penalised for going over the student number control 
target. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 http://www.hepi.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Clean-copy-of-SNC-paper1.pdf  
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3. Tuition fees and students’ expected future incomes: Evidence 
from a natural experiment 
3.1 Introduction 
Expected earnings lie at the heart of the decision to invest in education (Becker, 
1964; Betts, 1996; Webbink and Hartog, 2004; Jenson, 2010). Human capital theory 
explains that individuals will invest in education if their expected returns, measured in 
terms of present value of perceived future incomes, exceed present costs (including 
forgone earnings). Annual university tuition fees in England rose threefold to £9000 for 
undergraduate home and EU students entering universities from 2012 onwards. Using 
survey data collected since 2007 amongst first year undergraduate students at a British 
institution, we analyse whether the change in tuition fees in 2012 led to changes in 
students’ expected future incomes after graduation. As such, we indirectly assess 
whether post fee increase, the newly enrolled undergraduate students are better 
informed about their future job market prospects. This chapter contributes to the 
literature by indirectly testing Becker’s assumption that investment in education is 
driven by students’ perception of future returns. 
In 2010, the Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student 
Finance in England recommended a removal of the cap on maximum tuition fees English 
universities can charge to home and EU students. This subsequently led to the 
government lifting the tuition fee cap from £3,375 to £9,000, for home and EU students 
entering universities from 2012 onwards. Students from outside the EU were not 
affected by this reform, as their tuition fees are unregulated. Students are eligible to an 
interest free loan, for which repayments are conditional on an earning threshold. The 
reform additionally lifted the earning threshold above which students start to pay back 
their loans, from £15,795 to £21,000. Moreover, the government introduced more 
generous support to students from the poorest backgrounds, whilst introduced an 
income related real interest rate of up to 3 percent on student loans for the highest 
earners. Chowdry et. al. (2012) simulated UK graduates’ life time earnings post 2012 
reform and concludes the more progressive nature of the new funding system, such that 
the wealthiest graduate will face higher loan repayments due to the increased interest 
rates, whilst the poorest will receive more generous financial support. 
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The increased earning threshold for loan repayments and the variable interest 
rates applicable to graduates of different income levels should provide incentives for 
home and EU prospective students to gain information on their expected future income 
flows. To test this assumption, we assess whether students wage expectations were 
affected by the reform. We rely on a difference in difference methods with non-EU 
students being considered a control group, since they were not affected by the fee 
reform. 
Previous literature on expected earnings is relatively sparse. Manski (1991) 
summarised that economists tend to assume that students form their income 
expectations based on either their knowledge of realised earnings of those with similar 
characteristics (Freeman, 1971), or based on their personal characteristics and that they 
are aware of how supply and demand for skills determines wage rates (Willis and Rosen, 
1983). Dominitz and Manski (1996) carried out computer-assisted surveys over a group 
of high school and college students and find that while students are willing to provide 
meaningful answers to questions on their income expectations, they significantly 
overestimated the returns to college education. Empirical analysis finds heterogeneity 
in expected earnings across students by gender, age, subject of study, year of course at 
university and family backgrounds (Smith and Powell, 1990; Betts, 1996; Varga, 2001; 
Webbink and Hartog, 2004; Brenello et al., 2004; Delaney et al., 2011; Jerrim, 2011).  
Findings of Betts (1996), Brunello et al. (2004), Botelho and Pinto (2004) and Jerrim 
(2011) suggest university students go through a process of “learning” about labour 
markets and wage rates as they progress through university and on average revise down 
their expected future incomes as they get nearer to joining the labour market. These 
findings show that compared to first-year undergraduate students, students in senior 
years tend to have lower, more “realistic”20 expectations of future incomes as a result 
of learning about graduate labour market performances (Botelho and Pinto, 2004; 
Brunello et. al., 2004). This also suggests that as they revise their expected wages down, 
some students will decide to stop attending college and drop out. 
A couple of papers have assessed how information about returns affects decisions 
to invest in education. Jensen (2010) finds that after eighth grade boys at randomly 
                                                          
20 As being closer to realised earnings in the labour markets 
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selected Dominican schools were given information on the realised returns to secondary 
education, they revised (up) their expected returns and subsequently completed more 
years of schooling.  Following the government’s announcement of £9,000 tuition fees in 
late 2010 (to be implemented in 2012), McGuigan et al. (2012) find that debt-centred 
media reporting of the increased tuition fees at the time significantly increased the 
number of students who perceive going to university as ‘too expensive’, but providing 
students with simple information on the costs and returns to a university degree can 
substantially reduce this negative effect. However, as far as we are aware, few has 
analysed how students’ expected earnings might have changed following an exogenous 
shock to the cost of higher education. In other context, Lewis and Marvel (2011) propose 
that a relative increase in prices increases consumer’s willingness to search and indeed 
they find that consumers tend to search more when prices rise in the retail gasoline 
market.  
We hypothesise that students’ formulate their expected returns of higher 
education (or their expected earnings after graduation) as a function of their knowledge 
of realised labour market wage rates for university graduates, adjusted by their own 
academic ability, their perceived cost of university degrees, and a random error term.  
The random error term consists of two components, u1 is normally distributed with a 
mean of 0, and u2, which is positive and reflect the over-estimation of future earnings 
by freshmen students (see Betts, 1996; Brunello et al., 2004; Botelho and Pinto, 2004; 
and Jerrim, 2011). The increase in fees, by making it salient that reimbursement of loans 
is conditional on earnings should increase the demand for information about graduate 
salaries (see figure 3:A1 in the appendix)21 and readjust u2. To verify this, we study 
whether a rise in tuition fees does trigger this “learning” behaviour among first-year 
undergraduate students, by analysing changes in their expected future incomes. 
Since we cannot observe the characteristics of those who didn’t apply for 
universities, we investigate whether the increased tuition fees has made first year 
students more aware of labour market outcomes for university graduates. If the first 
year students have put more effort into learning relevant (graduate) wage information 
                                                          
21 In addition, we find that a Chow test of equality based on monthly data from 2006 to 2013, rejects the 
null that the number of Google searches on “Graduate salary” are the same before and after the tuition 
fees announcement in November 2010 (Chow test F=10.06), with more searches after 2010.” 
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as a consequence of higher fees, this should be reflected through changes in their 
expected earnings and expected returns after graduation. We use surveys handed out 
to first year undergraduate Economics students to elicit their expected future incomes, 
in the first week of term, at a large college of the University of London from 2007 to 
2013. 
Using surveys of first-year students and corresponding administrative data over 
the 7-year period, we find that increased tuition fees have no impact on students’ 
expected starting salary. However, we find some evidence that first year students in our 
sample do appear to be more aware of the labour market outcomes for university 
graduates, since expected wage growth and expected returns to higher education for 
home and EU students are around 30 percentage points lower post fee increase 
compared to overseas (Non-EU) students, bringing it closer to realised returns (32% for 
men and 42% for women) found by Walker and Zhu (2011) for Law, Economics and 
Management graduates.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the previous 
literature on students’ expected earnings. Section 3.3 describes the institutional set up 
and the policy change. Section 3.4 describes the data. Section 3.5 introduces the model 
and section 3.6 reports the findings. Section 3.7 presents robustness check. Section 3.8 
concludes. 
3.2 Literature 
According to Becker (1964), expected return is the most important factor that 
influences the decision to invest in education. This should warrant wide research 
interest, but economists have long been sceptical about the validity of empirical analysis 
based on subjective data collected from surveys. However, Dominitz and Manski (1996) 
find that income expectations of youth can be meaningfully elicited using surveys. 
Wolter (2000) replicated the computer-assisted survey in Dominitz and Manski (1996) 
over a small sample of Swiss high school and university students, and the results suggest 
students have rational expectations of future incomes. Botelho and Pinto (2004) carried 
out experiments as well as surveys to elicit expected return to higher education over a 
small sample of Portuguese college students. They finds no significant difference 
between income expectations elicited using hypothetical surveys or real financial 
incentives. The latter further strengthens the validity of research on income expectation 
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using survey data. Moreover, Botelho and Pinto (2004) also report that first year 
students expect higher or less “realistic” returns to college education than senior 
students, regardless of gender. 
Smith and Powell (1990) use surveys of senior college students at two midwestern 
universities in the U.S. and find that in general students have a good understanding of 
earnings of both college and high school graduates, but men tend to have a higher 
expected earnings ten years after (college) graduation, compare to their estimate for 
college peers. Betts (1996) use surveys of undergraduate students at a U.S. university 
and find that students’ average estimates of current young workers’ salaries are very 
close to reality, but this is more of the case for students in the senior years rather than 
freshman classes, which suggest that the former are more aware of graduate labour 
market outcomes as they prepare join the labour market themselves.  
In Europe, Brunello et al. (2004) analysed wage expectations of undergraduate 
business and economics students at universities across 10 European countries, and also 
find that senior students have lower, more realistic, expected earnings compared to 
students in the lower years. Jerrim (2011) compares UK undergraduate students’ 
expected starting salaries in 2005 with the average realised earnings of the same cohort, 
and concludes that on average, full time students overestimate their starting salary by 
about 15 per cent, and for freshman classes this figure stands at 20 per cent. Delaney et 
al. (2011) use surveys of undergraduate students at Irish universities and find that 
gender, risk preference, high school performance, college and subject choice, and years 
of parental education can influence both the short run and long run wage expectation.  
In general, these findings show a tendency for first-year students to over-estimate 
their future incomes, but their expectations become more realistic as they progress 
closer to the point of joining the labour market. 
To give a more detailed picture of how income expectations vary across students 
with different characteristics, previous studies show that male students (Smith and 
Powell, 1990; Betts, 1996; Webbink and Hartog, 2004; Brunello et al., 2004; Botelho and 
Pinto, 2004; Martins, 2006), and students from higher income families tend to have 
higher expected earnings (Smith and Powell, 1990; Betts, 1996; Varga, 2001; Webbink 
and Hartog, 2004). Webbink and Hartog (2004), Martins (2006), Delaney et al. (2011), 
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Jerrim (2011) find that students’ income expectations are also dependent on the subject 
area they study, with most of them show students of law, economics, and business and 
management subjects having higher expected earnings, which is consistent with 
differences in realised income between subjects. Martins (2006) and Delaney et al. 
(2011) find that parents’ education attainment is positively linked to students’ income 
expectations, while Brunello et al. (2004) show that students tend to have higher 
expected starting salaries (by 4%) if their mothers are educated to university level, but 
Smith and Powell (1990) or Bett (1996) find a negative relationship between fathers’ 
years of education and expected future incomes.  
In terms of controlling for individual ability, previous findings are rather mixed. 
Smith and Powell (1990), and Bett (1996) find that controlling for high school grades and 
SAT scores barely changed their estimates of expected income and subsequently those 
were dropped in Smith and Powell (1990). Rather than students’ realised score, Brunello 
et al. (2004) use expected grades and show that students who believe they have higher 
academic ability than their class peers also have higher expected incomes. Webbink and 
Hartog (2004) find that students with higher (secondary education) score in science 
expect higher earnings, but the same cannot be said for students with higher scores in 
other subjects. 
A limit of these papers is that more informed students may be the ones who have 
decided to go to university. To avoid this selection bias, Varga (2001) surveyed students 
in their senior years at Hungarian high schools and find that consistent with human 
capital theory, students’ expected returns from tertiary education have a positive and 
significant influence over their decision to apply for further studies, after controlling for 
their ability, family and high school characteristics. Jensen (2010) suggest that students 
are not necessarily well informed when they make their education decisions and he find 
that despite high measured returns, eighth grade boys (primary school) from Dominican 
Republic have very low expected returns to secondary education and only a small 
proportion would go on to study at secondary schools. However, from experiments 
carried out over students at randomly selected Dominican schools, he finds that this 
negative effect can be mitigated, particularly for the least poor students, if they were 
given information on the realised returns to secondary schooling. Similarly, McGuigan 
et al. (2012) show that running an ‘information campaign’ on the financial costs and 
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benefits of going to university among students (aged 14/15) at randomly selected 
secondary schools in London, can improve their understanding of the progressive nature 
of the 2012 UK higher education reforms, and hence counter the negative impact 
generated by the media reporting of the trebling of university tuition fees.   
3.3 Institutional Set-up 
The rapid expansion of the UK higher education sector, both in terms of the 
number of higher education providers, and the number of students (participation rate 
trebled from 1989 to 2010 - Wyness, 2010; BIS, 2013) challenged the public financing of 
higher education. The UK higher education funding system has undergone a series of 
reforms over the past thirty years: the 1989 White Paper introduced a means-tested 
student loan system, the 1998 Teaching and Higher Education Act imposed for the first 
time, an up-front tuition fee of £1000 for home and EU students entering universities 
from 1998 onwards22, and the 2004 Higher Education Act replaced the up-front tuition 
fees with a deferred fee of up to £3,00023 while increased financial support to students 
from the poorest backgrounds (Wyness, 2010). As for students from outside the EU, they 
are not publicly funded throughout this period and UK universities have been charging 
them the full cost of their education since 1980 (Harris, 1995). As such the number of 
overseas students each university can recruit are not limited and universities must 
compete for overseas students in order to generate additional revenue. 
The government still finances a substantial part of the cost of higher education, 
but through the introduction of student loans and lifting the cap on tuition fees, it 
gradually increased the amount that students need to contribute towards their 
education. Also rather than funding institutions directly, the reforms subsidise students, 
allowing competition a la Tiebout between institutions. Public funding accounted for 
roughly 40% of institutional income in England during the first decade of the 21st century. 
This figure fell to 30% in 2011/12, and it is estimated that it would fall to 23% in 2012/13 
(Universities UK, 2013). With the aim to further reduce the burden of higher education 
on public finance, the 2010 Independent Review of Higher Education and Student 
Finance (Browne Review) recommended a removal of the cap on university tuition fees 
for home and EU students, which had stood at a level of £3,000 - £3,375 from 2006 to 
                                                          
22 Students from poor family backgrounds were exempt 
23 To be implemented in 2006; “deferred” in the sense that students can apply for student loans to pay 
for their tuition fees. 
38 
 
2011. The government responded by lifting the maximum tuition fees English 
universities can charge to £9,000 instead, for home and EU students entering 
universities from 2012 onwards, with most institutions deciding to set their fees at the 
new upper limit24.  Overseas students are not affected by the policy change since they 
do not receive public funding and their fees are not capped25.  
The means-tested student loan system was implemented in the UK in 1990, which 
meant that once home and EU students graduate university and become employed, they 
pay back (part of) the cost of their university education26. Initially the interest rates on 
loans were indexed to the rate of inflation, and repayments wouldn’t start until 
graduates earn more than 85% of average earnings. This repayment threshold was 
changed to £10,000 (in cash terms) after the introduction of tuition fees in 1998, and 
the 2004 Higher Education Act further increased the repayment threshold to £15,000 
(Wyness, 2010). As part of the 2012 funding reform, the government lifted the 
repayment threshold again, from £15,79527 in 2012 to £21,000 in 2016. The government 
also introduced a variable real interest of up to 3% on student loans for graduates of 
different income levels, with those earning £41,000 or more facing the maximum 3% 
real interest rate. Chowdry et al (2012) summarised that the new system will also allow 
students from the poorest backgrounds to receive more generous financial support in 
terms of increased maintenance grants and maintenance loans. Using simulated data, 
Chowdry et al. (2012) also analysed the distributional impact of the 2012 reform and 
find that on average, graduates will be roughly £8,850 worse off over their life time, but 
the poorest will be better off given the increased financial support and generous loan 
                                                          
24 Royal Holloway, University of London, the institution where our data originates from, was one of the 
English universities that announced a tuition fee of £9,000 for home and EU students entering in 
2012/13 on full time undergraduate degrees. 
https://www.royalholloway.ac.uk/aboutus/newsandevents/news/newsarticles/royalholloway,university
oflondon,announcesfeesof9000from2012.aspx. Scottish students faced effectively zero tuition fees. 
Scottish graduate endowment was abolished for those graduated after 2007. Scottish students studying 
at Scottish institutions will have their tuition fees paid by the Scottish government, page 11, 
http://www.saas.gov.uk/_forms/sas4.pdf.  Welsh students studying anywhere in the UK can apply for a 
grant of up to £5,315 to cover part of the £9,000 fees. 
http://www.studentfinancewales.co.uk/continuing-students/201415-what-financial-support-is-
available/tuition-fee-support.aspx#.U99nqmB0z4g. There are less than 10 Welsh observations in our 
sample, and all of which occurred prior to 2012. 
25 Average tuition fees for overseas students for a classroom based degree is around £12,000, subject to 
inflation changes (Reddin, 2011) 
26Prior to 2006/07, loans were mainly used to cover maintenance cost while at university. Repayments 
are income contingent, and would be written off after 25 years (pre-2012)  
27 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/softwaredevelopers/paye/update2.htm 
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repayment terms, whilst the richest graduates (those earning more than £41,000) will 
pay back more due to the increased interest rates on their student loans. Given the 
changes in repayment threshold and the introduction of variable real interest rates on 
student loans, home and EU students entering universities from 2012 onwards should 
be more aware of their future income flows after graduation. 
In addition to the funding reforms, there was another policy change that would 
affect student recruitment in 2012. Higher Education Funding Councils in the UK are 
responsible for allocating public funds from the government to universities to support a 
range of teaching and research activities. For teaching, the size of payments are based 
on the number of home and EU students at each institution. The student numbers were 
fixed by the funding councils, implicitly fixing the teaching grant to institutions. 
Alongside the increase in tuition fees, the Higher Education Funding Council in England 
(HEFCE) relaxed the student number controls imposed over the recruitment of some 
home and EU students at English institutions. From 2012 onwards, universities in 
England are free to recruit as many home and EU students as they like, provided that 
the student has achieved the equivalent of UK A-level grades of AAB and above. The 
student number controls were further relaxed in 2013 with the grade threshold lowered 
to ABB. In the next section, we show that the post-2012 students have lower credentials, 
but do not differ in other dimensions. 
3.4 Data 
The data originates from two sources. We use surveys of first-year undergraduate 
Economics students at a British University from 2007 to 2013, and the corresponding 
administrative data which includes information on students’ country of domicile and 
pre-university qualifications. We keep first year undergraduate entrants only in the 
sample, and as such any students repeating their first year of courses will be dropped.  
The survey took place in the autumn term of each academic year, typically during 
the first lecture of the first-year economics core course Principles of Economics, where 
we tend to observe the highest attendance rates from students. Over 95% of students 
in our sample are taking a single or a joint degree programme in Economics and are 
registered with the Economics department at the time of survey.   
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The survey asks for mainly two sets of information from students. Firstly, it asks 
for students’ personal information and their family backgrounds, which include gender, 
age, ethnicity, parents’ education and family income28. Secondly, the survey aims to 
measure students’ expected earnings in four different dimensions29, namely expected 
wage upon graduation (expected starting salary), expected wage growth, 
overconfidence in expected wages and expected return to higher education. We define 
the expected wage growth as the log difference between students’ expected wage at 30 
and their expected starting salary (with a university degree). We define overconfidence 
as the log difference between students’ expected wage at 30 (with degree) and their 
estimation for their class peers. Finally, we define expected return to higher education 
as the log difference between the expected wage at 30 with and without a university 
degree. In addition, we also ask students whether they think that they will become self-
employed in their careers. We give no indication to students on whether they should 
include inflation when answering the expected income questions, and as such we 
assume that all responses are given in cash terms and we deflate all income variables 
used in the analysis to 2013 prices. The design of earnings questions closely follows that 
of Smith and Powell (1990) and Brunello et al. (2004), in the sense that we are concerned 
with two particular time points in a university graduate’s career, namely the expected 
earnings upon (university) graduation and the expected earnings at the age of 30, with 
and without a degree.  
The survey also contains a lottery question that is designed to elicit students’ risk 
preferences, but controlling for risk preferences barely changed our estimated 
coefficients of interests, and this is subsequently omitted from regression specifications.  
The non-response rates for some questions are high and certain information is not 
missing at random. Information on expected earnings is least missing for the expected 
                                                          
28 Outliers of family incomes, i.e., those with reported family income less than £5,000 are replaced with 
missing, and those with family income higher than £1.5 million are replaced with £1.5 million. A dummy 
variable is added to indicate which observation has missing family income information. The missing family 
incomes for home and overseas students are then replaced with the mean value (yearly) for each 
respective group to preserve the sample size. Outliers count for less than 3% of the 589 observations with 
reported family incomes  
29 Students are asked: i). In your first job after graduation what do you expect to earn (gross per year)? ii). 
By the age of 30, how much do you expect to be earning gross per year (not self-employed)? iii). By the 
age of 30, if you had not done a degree how much do you expect to be earning gross per year? iv). What 
is your best estimate of the average expected (gross annual) earnings, at age 30, of someone on your 
course?  
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starting salary question. As the questions become more complex, more students fail to 
report their expected future incomes30. The response rate falls from 89% for expected 
starting salary, to 66% for expected return to higher education. From table 3: A1 in the 
Appendix, we find that male students are less likely to fail to report their expected 
starting salary, estimated peer’s wage and their family income, but they are more like 
to fail to report their expected wage at 30 with or without degree.  Home students are 
less likely to be missing expected wage at 30 with or without degree, but the same can’t 
be said for those with higher family income. Those with higher family income are also 
likely to fail to report their estimated wage for class peers. Those who fail to report their 
family income are likely to fail to report their income expectations overall. Students of 
later cohorts are less likely to fail to report their family incomes, but the 2010 cohort are 
overall less likely to miss any of the income related questions. 
The corresponding administrative data includes students’ age on entry, fee bands 
(home/EU, overseas), pre-university qualifications (UCAS tariffs), and first-year end-of-
year exam results. Students’ pre-university qualifications, such as the UK A-levels and 
International Baccalaureate qualifications, are translated into UK UCAS tariff points 
based on their respective grades31. Information on students’ UCAS tariffs is not available 
for those who achieved their pre-university qualifications prior to the year of entry, and 
those whose qualifications cannot be translated into UCAS tariffs32. Out of the 298 
observations with missing tariff information, over 90% are EU and overseas students 
(based on their fee status and country of domiciles). The types of pre-university 
qualifications these students have may include French Baccalaureate, Italian High School 
Diplomas, German Abitur, Advanced Placement programmes in the US, and various 
university foundation programmes run by British universities. UCAS does not provide 
official translation of these qualifications into UCAS tariffs, but all are accepted by the 
majority of UK universities, which determines equivalence and sets entry requirements 
for each type of qualification independently. Similar to family incomes, those missing 
                                                          
30 i.e. At a time point beyond graduation (expected wage at 30) or in cases that are less applicable to 
themselves (estimate of average salary for class peers, or at age 30 without a university degree) 
31  The highest tariff points are given to the best grades. For the exact grade conversion, see 
http://www.ucas.com/how-it-all-works/explore-your-options/entry-requirements/tariff-tables 
32 Information on pre-university qualifications are only available for students whose prior qualification are 
accepted by British universities and also can be directly translated into UCAS tariffs 
42 
 
tariff information are also replaced with the mean value in that year, and flagged with a 
dummy. 33 
We merge the two datasets through students’ ID number, and overall we have 
1046 observations over a seven-year period from 2007 to 2013. 
Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the key variables. Overseas students 
on average are older than home and EU students by a very small margin. The difference 
between overseas students and home and EU students in terms of UCAS tariff and family 
income are fairly consistent both before and after the increase in tuition fees. There has 
been a decline in students’ average UCAS tariff during the period of concern, particularly 
after the fee increase in 201234 . This is consistent with the 2012 higher education 
admission reform which led to increased competition between English universities to 
attract students, and a decrease in the quality of the recruited students at the institution 
used for this analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 Despite the richness of our data, we cannot impute the missing tariff information or family incomes. 
For students, we only have information on gender, age, ethnicity, and nationality/domiciles; for family, 
we only have information on parents’ education and whether they own house.  
34 A Probit regression reveals no noticeable changes in the composition of the student population, apart 
from that on average students entered in or after 2012 have a lower UCAS tariff. See Table 3: A2 in the 
Appendix section. 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive statistic for key variables 
 
Source: Survey and administrative data of first year Economics students at a British University, 
2007 – 2013.  
 
There is a small increase in age on entry for home fee paying students. Despite the 
proportionally sharp increase in GDP per capita for overseas students after 2012, we 
show that controlling for business cycles in students’ declared country of domiciles does 
not change our baseline results by much. Compare to previous UK studies, students in 
our sample have relatively high expected earnings. The average expected starting salary 
is around £27,000 for home and EU students in our sample, which is noticeably higher 
than £18,300 found in Jerrim (2011)35. Walker and Zhu (2011) find that average college 
premium for Law, Economics and Management graduates is around 33% for males, and 
42% for females. The average expected return for students in our sample is around 
78%36. 
                                                          
35 The data used in Jerrim (2011) is based on surveys of over 3,000 undergraduate students across 70 UK 
universities in 2005, and the average realised salary for 2005 (UK) graduates is found to be £15,900.  
36 Similar to our definition of expected return to HE, Walker and Zhu (2011) defined college premium as 
the log difference in wages between those with a university degree and those with high school 
qualifications. 
Variables pre 2012 post 2012  pre 2012 post 2012
age on entry 18.63 18.70 19.29 19.05 1.72
(1.10) (1.36) (1.48) (1.27)
[484] [210] [248] [104]
Male 0.61 0.61 0.46 0.54 -1.12
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
[484] [210] [248] [104]
UCAS tariff 375.59 355.52 367.82 333.92 1.19
(83.20) (78.55) (72.78) (93.40)
[484] [210] [248] [104]
Family income (£000s) 91.69 99.34 157.99 166.46 -0.04
(81.32) (105.10) (238.51) (231.55)
[484] [210] [248] [104]
GDP per capita (2013 US dollars) 38141.58 37452.66 13999.34 20025.21 -3.60
(11167.03) (11388.24) (14676.93) (18590.84)
[484] [210] [248] [104]
Expected starting salary (£000s) 26.65 28.70 27.43 31.95 -0.92
(10.70) (18.33) (19.81) (29.60)
[440] [193] [214] [80]
Expected wage growth 0.73 0.69 0.78 1.03 -2.62
(0.45) (0.43) (0.68) (0.82)
[388] [173] [132] [39]
Over-confidence in expected earnings 0.16 0.13 0.02 -0.03 0.15
(0.49) (0.54) (0.69) (0.88)
[376] [168] [123] [40]
Expected return to HE 0.71 0.74 0.92 1.24 -2.42
(0.51) (0.47) (0.74) (0.89)
[361] [166] [123] [40]
UK & EU students Overseas students
Note: The statistics for each variable in each category is arranged by mean , (std. dev. ), and [number of observations ]. UCAS tariff 
information is not available (298 observations) for those who didn't take the qualification at the year of entry to university, those who didn't 
take qualifications that can be translated into UCAS tariff and those who dropped out before the end of their first year. Family income is 
missing for 457 observations. After eliminating outliers, these missing family income and UCAS tariffs are replaced by the mean value in that 
year. Income variables are measure in thousand British pounds. Outliers for all income variables are eliminated
 t-statistic 
(Diff-in-diff )
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for key variables
44 
 
3.5 Model 
As the increase in tuition fees only apply to home and EU students, we devise a 
difference-in-difference estimation for expected future income y for student i in year t, 
we therefore use overseas students as the control group: 
ln (yit) = fee increase + home fee status + fee increase x home + ∑ βi xi +∑ut + εit 
where xi is a set of personal and family characteristics, which includes age, gender, 
UCAS tariffs, exam grades, parental education, and family income, ut is a set of year 
dummies that captures any unobserved year specific effect 37 , and εt is the robust 
random error term. Standard errors are clustered at year level. Since the student 
population consists of a large number of nationalities, we also control for business cycles 
in students’ declared country of domicile by merging the dataset with the GDP per capita 
information collected from the International Monetary Fund38. 
The interaction term fee increase x home captures the changes in home and EU 
students’ expectations following the tuition fee increase, as compared to overseas 
students whom are unaffected by the change in fees. 
For our main estimates we use 2012, the year when the tuition fee increase comes 
into effect as the cut-off point (time of treatment). To check the robustness of our results, 
we later define the treated population as students entering from 2011 onwards, due to 
the announcement effect of the reform. 
Figure 3.1 presents the (estimated) expected earnings by student fee groups 
(home & EU, overseas), prior to the tuition fee reform in 2012. In each of the four graphs, 
expected earnings of home (& EU) students and overseas students tracked each other 
fairly consistently from 2007 to 2011.  Hence, overseas students is a reasonable control 
group to be used in our analysis.   
 
 
                                                          
37 An F-test shows the year dummies are jointly significant. Imposing a linear trend barely changes the 
size of our estimates, but it produces larger standard errors. 
38 More specifically the World Economic Outlook Database, provided by the IMF. This particular data 
contains IMF staff’s estimate of GDP per capita across countries in 2013, which is not yet available from 
the World Bank database 
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Figure 3.1: (Estimated) Expected earnings by student fee groups (home and EU, 
overseas): pre-2012 tuition fee reform 
 
Note: Clockwise from top left corner: expected starting salary, expected wage growth, expect 
return to HE and Overconfidence. Graphs based on (difference-in-difference) regression 
estimates of students’ expected earnings from 2007 to 2013, using survey data collected from 
first year undergraduate economics students at a British University. 
 
3.6 Results 
Table 3.2 shows the results for expected wage upon graduation. The coefficients 
on the interaction term are insignificant in all of the specifications, which suggest that 
the increase in tuition fees had no impact on students’ expected starting salaries. We 
test the effect of fee increase on expected starting salary in column 1, and we control 
for individual characteristics (age and gender) in column 2 and individual ability in 
column 3 and 4. Like previous studies (Smith and Powell, 1990; Betts, 1996; Varga, 2001; 
Webbink and Hartog, 2004), we control for family incomes in column 5 to account for 
the possibility that higher family income may allow students to have better labour 
market information. Since we have a diverse international student population, we also 
take into account any effect economic fluctuations in home countries may have on 
expected earnings (column 6).  
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Table 3.2: Expected wage upon graduation (2007 – 2013) 
VARIABLES ln (Expected starting salary - 2013 prices (£)) 
fee incr x home -0.0491 -0.0502 -0.0585 -0.0768 -0.0544 -0.0513 
 (0.103) (0.0913) (0.0884) (0.0863) (0.127) (0.124) 
fee increase -0.0818 -0.0711 -0.0521 -0.0675 -0.0622 -0.0646 
 (0.0701) (0.0613) (0.0599) (0.0609) (0.087) (0.0848) 
home fee status 0.0856 0.0737 0.0895 0.115** 0.127* 0.131* 
 (0.0537) (0.0442) (0.0470) (0.0391) (0.055) (0.0586) 
male  0.174*** 0.172*** 0.159*** 0.183*** 0.184*** 
  (0.0148) (0.0137) (0.0287) (0.0187) (0.0174) 
age on entry  0.0146 0.00748 0.0208* 0.0043 0.0046 
  (0.00869) (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0066) (0.0065) 
ln (UCAS tariff)   -0.0113  0.004 0.004 
   (0.0278)  (0.0297) (0.0278) 
missing UCAS tariff   0.0778*  0.065 0.0650 
   (0.0351)  (0.040) (0.0423) 
mother university     0.0349 0.0343 
     (0.0353) (0.0351) 
father university     0.0186 0.0180 
     (0.0259) (0.0270) 
ln (family income)     0.0456 0.0461 
     (0.029) (0.0288) 
missing family income     0.0252 0.0240 
     (0.0525) (0.0527) 
ln (exam grade)    -0.00171   
    (0.0407)   
ln (GDP per capita)      -0.003 
      (0.022) 
year dummies x x x x x x 
Constant 3.309*** 2.931*** 3.093*** 2.816*** 2.782*** 2.803*** 
 (0.0365) (0.160) (0.303) (0.242) (0.278) (0.423) 
       
Observations 927 927 927 872 888 887 
Adjusted R-squared 0.005 0.040 0.043 0.044 0.055 0.054 
Note: Source: Survey and administrative data of first year Economics students at a British 
University, 2007 – 2013. All income variables are deflated to 2013 prices. GDP per capita is in 
2013 US dollars. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Male students appear to have higher expected wage upon graduation, by about 
17%. The coefficient on male students is consistent with previous findings, and could 
reflect the persistent wage differentials between male and female workers in the labour 
market (Smith and Powell, 1990). Compare this result to previous findings on realised 
gender wage gap, Chevalier (2007) use UK data on a cohort of students who graduated 
in 1996 and find a gender wage gap of 12%. Purcell et al. (2013) tracked the 2006 (UK) 
university applicant cohort and find that the gender wage gap for those graduated in 
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2009/2010 from the same subject can vary from 4.3% in education to 28% in law. So the 
wage gap in expected earnings appear to reflect the market situation.  
Being classified as home fee paying student is also positively related to a higher 
expected wage upon graduation, but this is only significant at the 10% level, in column 
5 and column 639 . Using UCAS tariff or average exam grades to control for ability 
produced statistically insignificant estimates40 and it barely changes the main estimate 
of interest. The level of GDP per capita in students’ declared country of domicile does 
not appear to influence their expected starting salary. We have also used GDP and GDP 
growth, none of which changed our estimate of interest by much. 
Table 3.3 shows the results for expected wage growth, which is defined as the log 
difference between expected wage upon graduation and expected wage at the age of 
30 with degree). The mean expected wage growth for students in our sample is around 
74%. The coefficients on the interaction term are all statistically significant, and adding 
different sets of controls increases the precision but barely changes the magnitude. This 
finding suggests that the increase in tuition fees in 2012 for home and EU students is 
associated with a reduction in their expected wage growth by about 26 percentage 
points, relative to overseas students.  This brings the expected wage growth closer to 
the realised wage growth during the first 10 years of career, which is measured around 
50-60% (Manning and Swaffield, 2008). Among the first year students in our sample, 
one year increase in their age on entry to university lowers their expected wage growth 
on average by about 3.4 percentage points. Parental income can influence students’ 
access to labour market information (Betts, 1996), which would in turn affect their 
income expectations. Similar to Smith and Powell (1990) and Webbink and Hartog 
(2004), we find that students from higher income families expect higher wage growth; 
a 10% increase in family income is associated with a 1.2 percentage point increase in 
expected wage growth. However, it works in the opposite direction for those who failed 
to report their family incomes, and for them the expected wage growth is around 12 
percentage points lower. This statistically significant result again confirms that family 
                                                          
39 We find no interaction effect between home fee status and gender in any of our regression estimates. 
In all of our analysis, controlling for ethnicity barely changes our estimates of interest 
40 We also tested the robustness of our specifications by using UCAS tariff and UCAS tariff squared, 
neither of which changed our estimates by much. We stick to UCAS tariff in all latter specifications since 
we believe first-year exam results could be influenced by their experience of first year at university, and 
therefore cannot accurately reflect students’ true abilities  
48 
 
income is not missing at random. The positive link between expected wage growth and 
(reported) family income could also suggest that students look for realised incomes of 
people close-by when they form their own expectations. 
Table 3.3: Expected wage growth (2007 – 2013) 
VARIABLES Expected wage growth 
fee incr x home -0.269* -0.246* -0.284** -0.290** 
 (0.113) (0.110) (0.111) (0.116) 
fee increase 0.103 0.0740 0.122 0.127 
 (0.0902) (0.0886) (0.0856) (0.0896) 
home fee status -0.0636 -0.0956 -0.00453 -0.0182 
 (0.0781) (0.0700) (0.0674) (0.0841) 
male  0.0658* 0.0411 0.0391 
  (0.0303) (0.0257) (0.0258) 
age on entry  -0.0409** -0.0328* -0.0335 
  (0.0137) (0.0168) (0.0183) 
ln (UCAS tariff)  0.0465 0.0186 0.0185 
  (0.0566) (0.0606) (0.0608) 
missing UCAS tariff  0.0172 -0.0128 -0.0110 
  (0.0459) (0.0496) (0.0504) 
mother university   0.0581 0.0595 
   (0.0376) (0.0365) 
father university   -0.0167 -0.0156 
   (0.0393) (0.0417) 
ln (family income)   0.116*** 0.114** 
   (0.0315) (0.0335) 
missing family income   -0.0985*** -0.0964*** 
   (0.0163) (0.0153) 
ln (GDP per capita)    0.0106 
    (0.0369) 
year dummies x x x x 
Constant 0.929*** 1.412** 0.872 0.792 
 (0.0597) (0.463) (0.578) (0.496) 
     
Observations 732 732 703 702 
Adjusted R-squared 0.033 0.042 0.059 0.058 
Note: Source: Survey and administrative data of first year Economics 
students at a British University, 2007 – 2013. Expected wage growth is 
measured as the log difference between the expected wage at 30 (with 
degree) and expected wage upon (university) graduation. All income 
variables are deflated to 2013 prices. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Overconfidence is defined as the log difference between students’ expected wage 
at 30 (with degree) and their estimate for their class peers. Results from table 3.4 
suggest that the increase in university tuition fees does not appear to affect the 
tendency for students to be “over-confident”, or “self-enhance” in their expected 
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earnings (at the age of 30 with university degree). This implies that since home and EU 
students lowered their expected wage growth after graduation (table 3.3), they also 
revised down their estimates for class peers to the same extent. Consistent with Smith 
and Powell (1990) and Botelho and Pinto (2004), we find that male students appear to 
be “over-confident” in their expected earnings at 30, in the sense that their expected 
earnings at 30 are on average 18.7 percentage points higher than their estimate for class 
peers. We find that those who are eligible to pay home fees also tend to “self-enhance” 
in their expected earnings at 30, but the effect is much smaller, measured at 10 
percentage points on average41. 
Table 3.4: Overconfidence in expected wage at age 30 against peers (2007 – 2013) 
VARIABLES Overconfidence in expected earnings 
fee incr x home 0.0373 0.0358 0.0246 0.0344 
 (0.180) (0.179) (0.174) (0.167) 
fee increase -0.172 -0.153 -0.140 -0.149 
 (0.149) (0.143) (0.140) (0.135) 
home fee status 0.126** 0.137*** 0.133** 0.134** 
 (0.0513) (0.0360) (0.0423) (0.0446) 
male  0.193*** 0.182*** 0.183*** 
  (0.0207) (0.0126) (0.0109) 
age on entry  0.0044 0.0110 0.0114 
  (0.0068) (0.0081) (0.0080) 
ln (UCAS tariff)  0.0678 0.0953 0.0949 
  (0.0702) (0.0780) (0.0778) 
missing UCAS tariff  -0.0391 -0.0468 -0.0460 
  (0.0567) (0.0618) (0.0631) 
mother university   0.0357 0.0349 
   (0.0451) (0.0451) 
father university   -0.0600 -0.0602 
   (0.0616) (0.0612) 
ln (family income)  0.0734 0.0765 0.0768 
  (0.0458) (0.0453) (0.0449) 
missing family income  0.0131 0.0010 -0.0014 
  (0.0433) (0.0544) (0.0555) 
ln (GDP per capita)    0.0011 
    (0.0377) 
year dummies x x x x 
Constant 0.133** -0.797 -1.075 -1.071 
 (0.0391) (0.624) (0.721) (0.819) 
     
Observations 707 707 681 680 
Adjusted R-squared 0.013 0.043 0.037 0.037 
                                                          
41 We also tested whether overconfidence can be driven by male home fee paying students, but 
including an interaction term of home fee status and male yielded negative and statistically insignificant 
results. 
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Note: Source: Survey and administrative data of first year Economics 
students at a British University, 2007 – 2013. Overconfidence is 
measured as the log difference between students' expected earnings 
at 30 (with degree) and their estimate for their class peers. All income 
variables are deflated to 2013 prices. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3.5 shows the results for expected returns to university education. We 
define expected returns as the log difference between students’ expected wage at 30 
with and without a university degree. The mean expected returns for home and EU 
students before 2012 is around 71%. The coefficients on the interaction terms are all 
statistically significant and indicate that the increase in tuition fees is associated with a 
reduction in the expected returns to higher education by about 30 percentage points for 
home and EU students in our preferred specification (column 4). This is somewhat 
surprising, compared to Walker and Zhu (2011) where they simulated realised returns 
to LEM degrees under different tuition fees schemes (pre- and post-2012), and find that 
a sharp increase in fees (to £9,000) would only lower the returns by about 3%. 
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Table 3.5: Expected return to university education at age 30 (2007 – 2013) 
VARIABLES Expected return to university education 
fee incr x home -0.294* -0.316** -0.319* -0.320* 
 (0.138) (0.125) (0.136) (0.135) 
fee increase 0.189 0.212* 0.205 0.212* 
 (0.113) (0.102) (0.107) (0.108) 
home fee status -0.214** -0.177 -0.136 -0.204 
 (0.0860) (0.0963) (0.119) (0.139) 
male  0.0265 0.0122 0.0054 
  (0.0387) (0.0327) (0.0294) 
age on entry  -0.0268* -0.0193 -0.0226 
  (0.0121) (0.0154) (0.0176) 
ln (UCAS tariff)  0.0365 0.0444 0.0400 
  (0.0897) (0.0879) (0.0894) 
missing UCAS tariff  0.194** 0.134** 0.146** 
  (0.0628) (0.0425) (0.0424) 
mother university   0.0679* 0.0731* 
   (0.0332) (0.0333) 
father university   -0.0010 0.0049 
   (0.0329) (0.0337) 
ln (family income)   0.0838 0.0767 
   (0.0643) (0.0636) 
missing family income   -0.0342 -0.0284 
   (0.0538) (0.0527) 
ln (GDP per capita)    0.0541 
    (0.0475) 
year dummies x x x x 
Constant 1.094*** 1.277* 0.664 0.269 
 (0.0675) (0.576) (0.699) (0.553) 
     
Observations 690 690 666 665 
Adjusted R-squared 0.063 0.075 0.084 0.086 
Note: Source: Survey and administrative data of first year Economics 
students at a British University, 2007 – 2013. Expected return is measured 
as the log difference between expected wage at 30 with and without a 
university degree. All income variables are deflated to 2013 prices. GDP 
per capita is in 2013 US dollars. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As described in section 3.4 Data, UCAS tariff information is not missing at random. 
The coefficients on the missing tariff variable show that for those students, their 
expected return to a UK university degree is nearly 15 percentage points higher than the 
rest of the first-year student population in the preferred specification.  Similar to 
Brunello et al. (2004), we find that the students whose mothers went to university, have 
a higher expected return to university education, by about 7.2 percentage points. The 
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effect of fathers’ education on students’ income expectations are statistically 
insignificant in all of the regressions. 
Comparing our results in table 3.5 to previous findings, a reduction in home and 
EU students’ expected returns to higher education brings it closer to the realised wage 
premium for graduates who studied Law, Economics, and Management subjects, which 
are 33% for men and 42% for women (Walker and Zhu, 2011). This does appear to 
suggest that the increased tuition fees have made home and EU students more aware 
of graduate labour market performances and hence become relatively more realistic in 
their expectations of future incomes.  
3.7 Robustness checks 
From table 3.1 (Descriptive statistics), it is evident that there are some noticeable 
differences in characteristics between the treatment (home and EU students) and 
control (overseas students) groups, before and after the change in tuition fees. Overseas 
students are on average older than home (and EU) students. There are more female 
students in the overseas student sample. Home and EU students have higher UCAS 
tariffs on average, but lower family incomes. Furthermore, GDP per capita are higher for 
home and EU students. Hence, to check the robustness of our results against potential 
selection bias, we match overseas students to home students using propensity score, 
and assess the average treatment effect. 
Similar to earlier regression results, the average treatment effect of change in 
tuition fees on home students’ expected starting salary and over-confidence in expected 
earnings reveal no significant difference. However, the reduction in expected wage 
growth disappears, while the reduction in expected returns to university remains. Table 
3.7 details the quality of matching for the key control variables, and the results suggest 
that after matching, there is no statistically significant difference in the key control 
variables age, (log) UCAS tariffs, (log) family income, and (log) GDP per capita between 
the treatment and control groups. 
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Table 3.6: Expected future earnings (propensity score matching, 2007 – 2013) 
 
Source: Survey and administrative data of first year Economics students at a British University, 
2007 – 2013. 
 
Table 3.7: Quality of the propensity score matching – list of controls  
  Mean   t-test 
V(T)/V(C) Variable Treated Control %bias t p>|t| 
male 0.6099 0.49505 23.3 3.69 0 0.95 
age on entry 18.614 18.58 2.5 0.49 0.627 1.16 
ln (UCAS tariff) 5.8786 5.8794 -0.3 -0.05 0.964 1.63* 
missing UCAS tariff 0.1604 0.20198 -9.5 -1.72 0.086 0.84* 
mother university 0.40594 0.68713 -58.2 -9.35 0 1.12 
father university 0.45545 0.71287 -55.3 -8.59 0 1.21* 
ln (family income - £000s, 2013 prices) 4.1304 4.0871 5.3 0.97 0.33 1.03 
missing family income 0.34455 0.11485 47.7 9.01 0 2.22* 
ln (GDP per capita) 10.503 10.521 -2.3 -0.69 0.491 0.85 
 
Source: Survey and administrative data of first year Economics students at a British University, 
2007 – 2013. 
 
The government responded to recommendation made by the Browne Review by 
announcing the new £9,000 tuition fee cap in late 2010 (for it to be implemented in 
2012)42, and the British University used in our analysis decided that it will charge the full 
£9,000 to the 2012 cohort in April 2011. Hence, even though the 2011 cohort of first 
year students in our sample wouldn’t be paying the increased fees, we can’t rule out the 
possibility that they also collected more information of their future labour market. In 
this section we test the robustness of our results by controlling for any possible 
announcement effect. 
Table 3.8 includes interaction terms of year dummies with the increase in tuition 
fees in 2012 and the home-fee paying status, and the results show how home students’ 
expected earnings have changed each year during the period of 2007 – 2013.  For the 
expected return to university, the effect of increase in fees (sizable downward 
                                                          
42 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-11677862 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat
ln (Expected starting salary) Unmatched 3.31 3.24 0.07 0.03 2.09
ATT 3.31 3.31 0.00 0.21 -0.01
Expected wage growth Unmatched 0.71 0.83 -0.12 0.05 -2.57
ATT 0.71 0.70 0.01 0.23 0.04
Overconfidence in expected earnings Unmatched 0.14 0.00 0.15 0.05 2.93
ATT 0.14 -0.15 0.29 0.24 1.21
Expected return to university Unmatched 0.70 1.01 -0.30 0.05 -5.96
ATT 0.70 1.30 -0.59 0.28 -2.12
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adjustment) is only evident after 2012, but the announcement of higher fees in late 2010 
is associated with a downward adjustment in students’ expected starting salary, as well 
as over-confidence in expected earnings. 
Table 3.8: Change in students’ expected earnings by year (2007 – 2013).  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
ln 
(Expected 
starting 
salary) 
Expected 
wage 
growth 
Over-
confidence in 
expected 
earnings 
Expected 
return to 
university 
          
feeincr x home -0.0100 -0.142*** -0.232*** 0.0218 
 (0.0205) (0.0181) (0.0411) (0.0151) 
2012 x fee incr x home  0.236*** 0.428***  
  (0.0201) (0.0280)  
2013 x fee incr x home -0.296***   -0.212*** 
 (0.0278)   (0.0236) 
home fee status 0.241*** -0.295*** 0.180** -0.435*** 
 (0.0423) (0.0510) (0.0648) (0.0741) 
2008 x home 0.0311* 0.472*** 0.0114 0.322*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0221) (0.0273) (0.0409) 
2009 x home -0.0414** 0.198*** 0.105** -0.0762*** 
 (0.0134) (0.0177) (0.0352) (0.0140) 
2010 x home -0.221*** 0.300*** -0.0854** 0.346*** 
 (0.0201) (0.0149) (0.0329) (0.0278) 
2011 x home -0.164*** 0.414*** -0.177** 0.479*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0365) (0.0692) (0.0528) 
ln (family income) 0.0505 0.122** 0.0779 0.0893 
 (0.0273) (0.0376) (0.0465) (0.0628) 
male 0.175*** 0.0429 0.178*** 0.0118 
 (0.0188) (0.0262) (0.0130) (0.0290) 
fee increase -0.102*** -0.168*** -0.289*** 0.114** 
 (0.0148) (0.0139) (0.0152) (0.0321) 
age on entry 0.00542 -0.0325 0.00770 -0.0202 
 (0.00745) (0.0190) (0.00833) (0.0179) 
ln (UCAS tariff) -0.00682 0.0104 0.0698 0.0368 
 (0.0223) (0.0614) (0.0728) (0.0909) 
missing UCAS tariff 0.0698 -0.00706 -0.0489 0.154*** 
 (0.0395) (0.0512) (0.0663) (0.0381) 
mother university 0.0303 0.0616 0.0241 0.0800** 
 (0.0374) (0.0370) (0.0459) (0.0297) 
father university 0.0181 -0.0137 -0.0460 0.00373 
 (0.0291) (0.0445) (0.0635) (0.0342) 
missing family income 0.0165 -0.0917*** -0.00687 -0.0282 
 (0.0509) (0.0167) (0.0554) (0.0496) 
ln (GDP per capita) -0.0138 0.0148 -0.00591 0.0562 
 (0.0212) (0.0346) (0.0394) (0.0470) 
2008 -0.0289** -0.445*** -0.0574*** -0.362*** 
 (0.00996) (0.00780) (0.00929) (0.0195) 
2009 0.0473*** -0.252*** -0.218*** -0.000133 
 (0.00709) (0.0198) (0.0272) (0.0200) 
2010 0.103*** -0.494*** -0.0627** -0.439*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0160) (0.0216) (0.0198) 
2011 0.0563** -0.469*** 0.0304 -0.567*** 
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 (0.0207) (0.0321) (0.0508) (0.0338) 
2012    -0.137*** 
    (0.0210) 
2013 0.233*** 0.198*** 0.367***  
 (0.0219) (0.0148) (0.0149)  
Constant 2.874*** 0.947 -0.838 0.337 
 (0.366) (0.532) (0.815) (0.471) 
     
Observations 887 702 680 665 
Adjusted R-squared 0.063 0.066 0.039 0.098 
Note: Source: Survey and administrative data of first year Economics students at 
a British University, 2007 – 2013. All income variables are deflated to 2013 prices. 
See notes in tables 3.2 - 3.5 for calculations of each dependent variable. GDP per 
capita is in 2013 US dollars. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To assess the heterogeneity in the effect of fees changes between gender, we 
interact the increase in fees in 2012 with home-fee paying status, and the gender of 
students. The results from table 3.9 suggest that, overall home and EU students have 
revised down their expected wage growth and expected returns to university, but male 
home and EU students also revised down their expected starting salary and their 
penchant for being over-confident in expected earnings. 
Table 3.9: Heterogeneity in students’ expected earnings (gender). (2007 - 2013) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
ln (Expected 
starting 
salary) 
Expected 
wage 
growth 
Over-confidence 
in expected 
earnings 
Expected 
return to 
university 
          
fee incr x home 0.0425 -0.281** 0.124 -0.378** 
 (0.121) (0.0945) (0.135) (0.132) 
male 0.215*** 0.0424 0.213*** -0.0155 
 (0.0375) (0.0352) (0.0202) (0.0357) 
fee incr x home x male -0.148*** -0.0141 -0.134** 0.0906 
 (0.0349) (0.0429) (0.0533) (0.0708) 
fee increase -0.0633 0.127 -0.153 0.212 
 (0.0831) (0.0890) (0.132) (0.109) 
home fee status 0.127* -0.0188 0.129** -0.201 
 (0.0583) (0.0840) (0.0424) (0.141) 
age on entry 0.00391 -0.0336 0.0103 -0.0218 
 (0.00648) (0.0183) (0.00770) (0.0179) 
ln (UCAS tariff) 0.00268 0.0184 0.0929 0.0411 
 (0.0294) (0.0617) (0.0772) (0.0878) 
missing UCAS tariff 0.0665 -0.0109 -0.0454 0.145** 
 (0.0420) (0.0505) (0.0628) (0.0422) 
mother university 0.0319 0.0593 0.0348 0.0734* 
 (0.0357) (0.0367) (0.0457) (0.0336) 
father university 0.0176 -0.0157 -0.0617 0.00494 
 (0.0270) (0.0418) (0.0617) (0.0338) 
ln (family income) 0.0458 0.114** 0.0771 0.0763 
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 (0.0289) (0.0336) (0.0452) (0.0631) 
missing family income 0.0209 -0.0969*** -0.00588 -0.0258 
 (0.0508) (0.0161) (0.0558) (0.0555) 
ln (GDP per capita) -0.00330 0.0105 -0.00134 0.0545 
 (0.0212) (0.0369) (0.0382) (0.0483) 
year dummies x x x x 
Constant 2.814*** 0.794 -1.047 0.255 
 (0.424) (0.505) (0.795) (0.551) 
     
Observations 887 702 680 665 
Adjusted R-squared 0.058 0.056 0.038 0.086 
Note: Source: Survey and administrative data of first year Economics students at a British University, 
2007 – 2013. All income variables are deflated to 2013 prices. See notes in tables 3.2 - 3.5 for 
calculations of each dependent variable. GDP per capita is in 2013 US dollars. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Students’ socio-economic status is not recorded in the survey or the 
administrative data. Hence, we use their family income as a proxy to test for 
heterogeneity in the effect of fee changes between students of different family 
backgrounds. In table 3.10, the increase in tuition fees in 2012 and the home fee paying 
status are interacted with quintiles of family income. This barely changes earlier 
estimates, while the coefficients on the interaction terms suggest that changes in home 
students’ expected earnings do not seem to vary by family income. 
Table 3.10: Heterogeneity in students’ expected earnings (family income levels). (2007 - 2013) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
ln 
(Expected 
starting 
salary) 
Expected 
wage 
growth 
Over-
confidence 
in expected 
earnings 
Expected 
return to 
university 
          
fee incr x home -0.0184 -0.261* 0.0501 -0.378*** 
 (0.143) (0.117) (0.121) (0.0995) 
fam income quintiles 0.0293* 0.0487* 0.0364 0.0248 
 (0.0128) (0.0220) (0.0248) (0.0141) 
fee incr x home x family income quintiles -0.0113 -0.00653 -0.00461 0.0222 
 (0.0129) (0.0205) (0.0432) (0.0176) 
male 0.183*** 0.0361 0.181*** 0.00355 
 (0.0174) (0.0260) (0.0113) (0.0298) 
home fee status 0.0936 -0.111 0.0734 -0.266* 
 (0.0531) (0.0804) (0.0535) (0.110) 
age on entry 0.00356 -0.0372* 0.00901 -0.0257 
 (0.00631) (0.0174) (0.00719) (0.0167) 
ln (UCAS tariff) 0.00277 0.0217 0.0945 0.0408 
 (0.0282) (0.0611) (0.0817) (0.0884) 
missing UCAS tariff 0.0636 -0.0115 -0.0460 0.147** 
 (0.0422) (0.0487) (0.0601) (0.0448) 
mother university 0.0326 0.0584 0.0332 0.0730* 
 (0.0340) (0.0371) (0.0457) (0.0316) 
father university 0.0178 -0.00841 -0.0559 0.00670 
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 (0.0277) (0.0409) (0.0580) (0.0320) 
missing family incomes 0.0260 -0.0727** 0.0109 -0.00921 
 (0.0504) (0.0232) (0.0569) (0.0594) 
ln (GDP per capita) -0.00301 0.0175 0.00216 0.0599 
 (0.0226) (0.0359) (0.0379) (0.0477) 
year dummies x x x x 
Constant 2.978*** 1.191** -0.783 0.565 
 (0.416) (0.447) (0.765) (0.470) 
     
Observations 887 702 680 665 
Adjusted R-squared 0.053 0.047 0.032 0.081 
Note: Source: Survey and administrative data of first year Economics students at a British 
University, 2007 – 2013. All income variables are deflated to 2013 prices. See notes in tables 3.2 
- 3.5 for calculations of each dependent variable. GDP per capita is in 2013 US dollars. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3.11 shows regressions results of students’ expected earnings after the 2008 
financial crises, in the period of 2010 – 2013. We choose the period as 2010 is the first 
year UK GDP picked up following the crisis (based on current US dollars)43.  The reduction 
in expected wage growth and expected return to university found in earlier regressions 
still persist, but magnitude of estimates increased and the results now suggest that the 
increase in tuition fees in 2012 reduced expected wage growth and expected return to 
university by 36 and 52 percentage points respectively. 
Table 3.11: Students’ expected earnings post 2009. (Post financial crisis) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
ln (Expected 
starting 
salary) 
Expected 
wage 
growth 
Over-confidence 
in expected 
earnings 
Expected 
return to 
university 
          
fee incr x home 0.0550 -0.364* 0.110 -0.521** 
 (0.117) (0.114) (0.175) (0.112) 
fee increase -0.0568 0.339** -0.0757 0.604*** 
 (0.0807) (0.0828) (0.133) (0.0892) 
home fee status 0.00999 0.0217 0.145** -0.0337 
 (0.0550) (0.104) (0.0391) (0.112) 
male 0.190*** 0.0301 0.180*** 0.0147 
 (0.0204) (0.0292) (0.0236) (0.0383) 
age on entry 0.00641 -0.0495** 0.0158* -0.0253 
 (0.00574) (0.0133) (0.00564) (0.0224) 
ln (UCAS tariff) 0.0120 -0.00713 0.0811 -0.0580 
 (0.0381) (0.0845) (0.104) (0.109) 
missing UCAS tariff 0.0894 0.0170 -0.0508 0.171* 
 (0.0431) (0.0734) (0.109) (0.0613) 
mother university 0.0218 0.0768* 0.0444 0.0526** 
 (0.0475) (0.0298) (0.0406) (0.0164) 
father university 0.00554 -0.0446 -0.0663 -0.0317 
 (0.0452) (0.0415) (0.0550) (0.0370) 
                                                          
43 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD 
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ln (family income) 0.0384 0.138** 0.0957* 0.148*** 
 (0.0314) (0.0417) (0.0302) (0.0247) 
missing family income 0.0878 -0.0969** -0.0129 0.0104 
 (0.0676) (0.0254) (0.0614) (0.0849) 
ln (GDP per capita) 0.0103 0.0460 -0.0649** 0.0896 
 (0.0391) (0.0267) (0.0151) (0.0577) 
year dummies x x x x 
Constant 2.631** 0.600 -0.605 -0.0981 
 (0.653) (0.604) (0.700) (0.876) 
     
Observations 561 448 436 429 
Adjusted R-squared 0.052 0.095 0.026 0.146 
Note: Source: Survey and administrative data of first year Economics students at a 
British University, 2007 – 2013. All income variables are deflated to 2013 prices. See 
notes in tables 3.2 - 3.5 for calculations for each dependent variable. GDP per capita is 
in 2013 US dollars. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
Using surveys of first-year economics students at a British University, we 
contribute to the existing literature by showing how income expectations change 
following an increase in the cost of higher education. We find that while the sharp 
increase in tuition fees in 2012 had no impact on students’ expected starting salary, it 
lowers student’s expected wage growth and expected return to higher education by 
about 30 percentage points. Despite that the increase in tuition fees is associated with 
a fall in students’ expected returns to higher education, our results show that they still 
expect positive and significant financial returns from investing in a university degree. 
This is consistent with the human capital theory.  We should note that even if the 
estimates take into account all expected changes in the cost of higher education, the 
results still reflect a sizable change in students’ expected earnings. 
Great caution is required when applying our results to the rest of the UK 
undergraduate student population. After all, average (reported) family income for first-
year economics students (Home and EU) in our sample is around £80,000, which falls 
within the top decile of UK household incomes44, and suggest that credit constraints 
may be less of a problem to this particular sample and also they should have easier 
access to (graduate) labour market information (Betts, 2006). In addition, all students in 
our sample are full time students, and over 96% are under the age of 21. Over 40% of 
                                                          
44 For a family of two adults and two teenage children (and falls under UK council tax band D: £1,500), 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/wheredoyoufitin/ 
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students stated their ethnicity as “white”, and over another 40% of students stated their 
ethnicity as “Chinese”, “Indian” or “other”.  Overseas students (non-home fee paying) 
take up a third of our overall sample, and such proportion of international students are 
one of the highest among UK universities45. Hence although (home and EU) students in 
our sample may appear to be more “realistic” in their income expectations following the 
sharp increase in tuition fees, we make no implications that this will be the case for the 
rest of first-year home and EU students at this particular university, or indeed the rest 
of first-year home and EU students at other English universities. 
Although we cannot observe those who chose not to apply to university in 2012, 
McGuigan et al. (2012) find that media reporting of the increased tuition fees has 
significantly increased the number of secondary school students who considers going to 
university as ‘too expensive’. Hence, it is possible that like the first year home and EU 
students in our sample, these prospective students revised down their expected returns 
to university, but to the extent that investing in higher education no longer seems 
worthwhile. However, this is inconsistent with Walker and Zhu (2011) which find that 
the sharp increase in fees should only lower the returns by a very small amount, and 
Chowdry et al. (2012) which find that the 2012 fee reform is more progressive in nature. 
Hence, the reduction in expected returns for those who didn’t apply to university could 
be based on inaccurate or incomplete information. If this is the case, we believe that the 
fall in applications in 201246 calls for government intervention47 in terms of providing 
prospective students with easier access to information on the true cost of higher 
education and graduate labour market outcomes, given that Jensen (2010) and 
McGuigan et. al. (2012) find that a simple information campaign can significantly 
improves people’s perception of returns to schooling.  
 
 
 
                                                          
45 http://www.thecompleteuniversityguide.co.uk/international/international-students-the-facts/by-
university/ 
46 The drop in applications roughly translates to a drop of 50,000 applicants compared to previous years, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-18768857 
47 Since investment in higher education is shown to have positive social returns as well (Greenaway and 
Haynes, 2003). 
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4. Price sensitivity of non-EU students to British Higher Education 
4.1 Introduction 
Despite institutions charging the full cost of their higher education48, the number 
of international students (non-EU) at British universities has more than tripled over the 
past twenty years (Universities UK, 2011). With the sharp increase in student numbers, 
comes significant financial contribution to the British economy. Such export of UK higher 
education is valued at around £10 billion in 2011/12 (HEFCE, 2014). Given the shrinking 
public funding that UK universities receive (Universities UK, 2013), and the potential 
economic growth that well trained university graduates (home or overseas domiciled) 
can generate (Chellaraj et al., 2008; Barro, 2011; Bergerhoff et al., 2013), it is important 
both for the higher education institutions and the UK economy to sustain a high demand 
for university education from overseas students. With a tuition fee of £9,000 for home 
and EU students, and an average tuition fee of £12,000 for overseas students, the UK 
has one of the highest level of tuition fees in Europe 49 . We analyse how overseas 
students’ enrolment decisions can be affected by the level of tuition fees UK institutions 
charge.  
There are a number of studies on international migration and the subsequent 
“brain gain/drain” effect (Bartel, 1989; Gould et al., 2009; Agrawal et. al., 2011; Gibson 
and McKenzie, 2012; Kerr and Kerr, 2013), but few analyse factors that influences 
students’ choice of university/degree programme after they have decided to pursue 
higher education in a different country. This is particularly the case for the UK, despite 
the significant expansion of the overseas student population in the country, and the 
substantial contribution they make to the UK economy. Rosenzweig (2006) find that 
foreign students coming to study in the US are driven by prospects of higher returns to 
skills in the US, rather than a lack of education resources/facilities in the home country. 
Beine et. al. (2012) use data from 13 OECD countries and find that network, housing 
prices and reported quality of university can influence overseas students’ choice of 
destination countries, but they do not find any effect of university registration fees. 
Students’ decision to study in the UK could be driven by many factors, including the 
quality of UK higher education50, the close proximity to other European countries, the 
                                                          
48 Average of £11,000 for a classroom based degree. 
49 http://www.studyineurope.eu/tuition-fees  
50 http://www.theguardian.com/higher-education-network/blog/2012/may/11/universitas-21-rankings  
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returns from learning English as a second language, and being able to enjoy the wage 
premium that the UK labour market offers relative to their home countries. Unlike 
previous studies on the determinants of student migration, we contribute to the existing 
literature by analysing how price (tuition fees) sensitive non-EU students are once they 
have decided to study in the UK. We recognise that the UK is not the sole player in the 
international higher education market, and the US, Canada, Australia are other major 
destinations for students who wish to purse higher education abroad. Hence, 
prospective students could be comparing universities and the level of tuition fees 
between countries when they make their decision on where to study.  For the purpose 
of this analysis, we should note that we take overseas students’ decision to study in the 
UK implicitly as given. 
Tuition fees in the United Kingdom are not uniform across its four constituent 
countries, England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. However, under European 
rules, European-domiciled students studying anywhere in the UK are treated by British 
universities the same way as locally domiciled students and therefore paying subsidised 
fees. Hence for the purpose of our study, we define non-EU/overseas/international 
students as those from outside the Europe and are subject to the higher tuition fees.     
Prior to 1998, the UK government used to fully subsidize the costs of higher 
education for home and European domiciled students. A series of higher education 
reforms introduced by the government in late 80s and the early 90s tripled the higher 
education participation rate but also brought considerable strains to public financing for 
higher education, and the funding per full time students nearly halved during this period 
(Dearden et al., 2011). Hence, for home and EU students registered at institutions in 
England (and Northern Ireland prior to 2012), means-tested up-front tuition fees of 
£1,000 was introduced to students entering universities from 1998 onwards. The up-
front fee was abolished in 2006, and replaced with a deferred fee of maximum £3,000 
in 2006, and this cap was lifted to £9,000 in 2012.  A student loans system was 
introduced in 1990 to help home and EU students pay for their maintenance costs and 
tuition fees. Prior to 2012, students could borrow at zero real interest rates, and 
repayments don’t start until they earn above a certain threshold51.  
                                                          
51 From 2006 to 2012, £10,000 from 1998 to 2005, more than 85% of average earnings from 1990 to 
1997(Wyness, 2010). 
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The other part of the costs of providing higher education is paid by the Higher 
Education funding councils which provide teaching grants to institutions based on the 
number of home and EU students taught. To contain costs, institutions were limited until 
2012 to a set number of home and EU students.   
On the other hand, overseas students do not receive financial support from the 
government and institutions are free to set their tuition fees. Hence the recruitment of 
overseas students are not restricted, and with the immense funding pressure faced by 
the whole higher education sector, overtime UK institutions increased their effort to 
attract overseas students in order to sustain their income streams. 
We use data on UK first-year undergraduate student population to assess the price 
sensitivity of prospective students when they make their enrolment decisions, after 
controlling for institutional quality. We build a panel of first-year undergraduate 
students by institution, and country of domiciles (England, Wales, Scotland, Northern 
Ireland, European (EEA) countries, and non-EU countries). Overall, we find that overseas 
students do not appear to react negatively to higher tuition fees, and better ranked 
institutions and institutions with more home/UK students tend to attract more students 
from outside the Europe. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews previous 
literature. Section 4.3 describes the background of our analysis. Section 4.4 describes 
the data. Section 4.5 introduces the model. Section 4.6 describes the results. Section 4.7 
tests the robustness of our findings, and section 4.8 concludes.  
4.2 Literature Review 
It has often been argued that migration of skilled labour can greatly benefit the 
economy of receiving countries, but at the same time, the flow of knowledge and 
resources to the home countries of the emigrants can also benefit sending countries’ 
domestic economic growth (Agrawal et. al., 2011). Similar findings can be found in 
Batista et al. (2012), Beine et al. (2010), Beine et al. (2008), Chad and Clemens (2008). 
Barro (2011) used data for around 100 countries and find that higher years of schooling 
for adult males is positively associated with stronger economic growth52. Chellaraj et al. 
(2008) find that foreign students contribute greatly to research and development in the 
                                                          
52 Measured by real GDP per capita. 
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US, as a 10% increase in the number of foreign graduate students is associated with a 
4.5% increase in patent applications, and it is also associated with increased patent 
grants. An even bigger effect is found by Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2008), which shows 
that a one percentage point increase in foreign graduate students increases patents per 
capita by about 15%.  Based on a two-country model, Bergerhoff et al. (2013) find that 
international migration of students is associated with higher (steady-state) economic 
growth in the receiving countries.   
Rosenzweig (2006) proposes two factors that drives the international migration of 
students, a lack of educational resources/facilities and a low return to skills in the 
sending country. He finds that the US wage premium (over other countries) encourages 
foreign students to migrate. Clemens (2013) finds that location alone can explain a 
significant part of return to skills. De Vreyer et al. (2010) find that experience abroad 
results in a substantial wage premium for migrants returning from an OECD country, not 
from other countries.  
Students migrating to the UK to study could also be driven by the returns to 
learning English as second language. A number of studies find that (foreign/second) 
language skills is positively linked to earnings. Angrist and Lavy (1997) analysed the 
effect of change in language of instruction at Moroccan schools and find that the change 
from French to Arabic to deliver school curriculum has lowered the returns to schooling 
for those who are affected. Using Israeli and US data, Berman et al. (2003) and Bleakley 
and Chin (2004) find that language proficiency complements earnings of immigrant 
workers. As for the return to language skills to workers in developing countries, Azam et 
al. (2010) use Indian data and find that being fluent in English (compared to not speaking 
any English at all) increases hourly wages of men by 34%.  
Based on data of 18 European countries, Van Bouwel and Veugelers (2009) find 
that the quality of higher education is positively linked to the number of students 
migrating from one country to the other. Similar findings can also be found in Gordon 
and Jallade (1996). Quality of education can also influence students’ decision to migrate 
within a country. Baryla and Dotterweich (2011) analyse student migration in the US and 
find that colleges that provide a recognised quality degree programme attracts more 
non local students.  Using panel data on the flow of international students to North 
America and a number of developed European countries, Kahanec and Kralikova (2011) 
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find that indeed, the quality of higher education in the receiving country is an important 
factor in determining the inflow of foreign students, but no significant correlation is 
found between tuition fees and size of overseas student population. They contribute the 
latter finding to reverse causality in the sense that popular universities can afford to 
charge a higher price. Similarly, Beine et. al. (2012) use data of 13 OECD countries to 
analyse factors that influence international students’ choice of destination countries, 
and find significant network effect in the migration of students, other factors include 
housing prices and reported quality of university, but not registration fees. Their initial 
findings even suggested a positive relationship between tuition fees and the size of the 
flow of international students. They propose two explanations for this apparent positive 
results. First, tuition fees may act as a signal of quality. Secondly, popular destinations, 
and universities with high reputation can charge higher fees without losing their 
applicant pool. In the UK, Soo and Ellliot (2010) used overseas subject-level application 
data to UK universities from the period of 2002 to 2007, and find that fees may impact 
overseas students’ application decisions, and this effect is non-linear.  
Previous analysis on the impact of fees on domestic enrolment, Kane (1995) used 
US data for the period of 1977 to 1993 to evaluate price sensitivity of students to tuition 
fees at US public higher education institutions. He find that states with higher level of 
tuition fees experience lower enrolment rates, with the effect vary between 3.5 
percentage point for public 2-year institutioins, to 1.4 percentage points for 4-year 
institutions, for each $1,000 increase in fees. Using US data of American public 
universities (4-year institutions) from the period of 1991 to 2007, Hemelt and Marcotte 
(2008) find that a $1000 increase in fees is associated with a reduction in college 
enrolment by about 2.5 percent. For the effect of tuition fees on higher education 
participation in the UK over the same period, Dearden et al. (2011) constructed pseudo-
panels by aggregating individual level data (over UK-domiciled students) and find that, 
higher tuition fees are negatively linked to university participation rate, with the effect 
measured at 3.9 percentage points decrease in university participation for every £1,000 
increase in tuition fees. Seven German states briefly introduced university tuition fees 
in 2012, and Dwenger et al. (2012) find that the probability of students applying to 
university fall by 2 percentage points if they live in a state with tuition fees. Similar 
findings using German data can also be found in Hubner (2012). 
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4.3 Institutional set-up 
The UK higher education system for home and EU students was entirely state 
funded prior to 1998. The government introduced a series of reforms in late 80s and the 
early 90s to boost the higher education participation rate in the UK, namely the 1989 
White Paper which introduced a student loans system for it to be implemented in 1990, 
and the 1992 Further Education and Higher Education Act which changed the status of 
former polytechnics to universities and introduced funding councils for universities in 
England. The participation rate subsequently went up from 15% in 1989 to 42% in 2005 
(Wyness, 2010). This brought considerable strains to public financing for higher 
education, and the funding per full time students declined from £9,000 in 1989 to £4,850 
(Dearden et al., 2011). Hence, a student loans system was implemented in 1990, initially 
its purpose was to cover part of the cost of student maintenance, and from 2006 
onwards, it is extended tuition fees as well. Furthermore, the 1998 Higher Education Act 
introduced means-tested up-front tuition fees of £1,000 to students entering 
universities from 1998 onwards.  
Six years later the 2004 Higher Education Act abolished up-front tuition fees and 
introduced a deferred fee of £3,00053 to be implemented in 2006 for students domiciled 
in England and Northern Ireland. Responding to recommendations made by the Browne 
Review of higher education funding in 2010, the Government announced that the 
maximum tuition fees UK universities can charge will be raised to £9,000 for English 
domiciled students and EU students who wish to enter universities in England from 2012 
onwards. The interest rates on student loans was indexed to the rate of inflation prior 
to 2012, and students did not have to make repayments until they earned above 
£15,00054. This was changed in the 2012 tuition fee reforms, and a variable real interest 
rate of up to 3% was introduced to student loans, but the repayment threshold was 
lifted to £21,000.  
Like institutions in the rest of the UK, Scottish universities initially adopted the 
£1,000 tuition fees in 1998, but this up-front tuition fees was abolished by the Scottish 
                                                          
53 “Deferred” in the sense that students can borrow at effectively zero interest rates to pay for their 
tuition fees, and repay their loans after they have graduated and earn above a set threshold.  
54 From 2006 to 2012, £10,000 from 1998 to 2005, more than 85% of average earnings from 1990 to 
1997(Wyness, 2010). 
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Government in 2001, and replaced with the graduate endowment scheme55. This was 
abolished in 200756, and for subsequent cohorts of Scottish students studying at Scottish 
institutions, they would have their tuition fees paid by the Scottish government57. Since 
our data started from 2002/03, this effectively means that the 2002 cohort of Scottish 
domiciled students and European students studying at Scottish universities, are the only 
ones that actually paid the Graduate endowment scheme in our period of analysis58.  In 
addition, several types of students were exempt from paying the Graduate Endowment, 
including mature students, part-time students, those studying Midwifery or nursing 
courses59. 
The 2004 Higher Education Act raised tuition fees from 2006 onwards from £1,200 
to £3,000 for students in England and Northern Ireland, but the fee increase was delayed 
among Welsh universities to 2007 and a grant was introduced for Welsh students (and 
European students studying in Wales) to cover the amount of the fee increase (Wyness, 
2010). For the 2012 tuition fee reform, the Welsh government increased the grant to 
Welsh students to £5,425, whilst the rest of the £9,000 can be covered by tuition fee 
loans, and this applies not just to Welsh students who studies in Wales, but Welsh 
students studying anywhere in the UK. Tuition fees in Northern Ireland changed very 
much in line with tuition fees in England, except in 2012 when it decided to freeze the 
tuition fees for students who are domiciled and enrolled at higher education institutions 
within Northern Ireland60. Students from continental Europe who are studying at each 
of the four constituent countries of the United Kingdom are able to enjoy the same 
benefits as locally domiciled students, but in general UK students who are domiciled in 
one of the constituent countries and wish to study in another do not enjoy the same 
financial support towards tuition fees as a locally domiciled students.  
                                                          
55 A payment of £2,000 (cash term, fixed) payable in April following graduation. 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S1_Bills/Education%20(Graduate%20Endowment%20and%20Stude
nt%20Support)%20(Scotland)%20Bill/b22s1pm.pdf  
56 For all that graduate after April 2007. 
57 The tuition fees for Scottish students studying at Scottish universities currently stands at £1,820.  
http://www.saas.gov.uk/full_time/ug/young/funding_available.htm.  
58 We find that including Graduate Endowment in the fees barely changes our estimate and hence this is 
subsequently omitted in our analysis.  
59 For a full list of student groups that are exempt from paying Graduate endowment, see 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2002/04/14605/3634  
60 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-14843377 
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Higher Education funding councils provide teaching grants to institutions based on 
the number of home and EU students there are in each institution. Hence, prior to 2012, 
institutions were limited to the number of home and EU students they could recruit, or 
they would be penalised in terms of the teaching grant they received in the following 
year.  The Higher Education Funding Council in England have relaxed the student number 
control from 2012 onwards, so that institutions are free to recruit as many home/EU 
student as they like, provided that the student has achieved the UK A-level equivalent 
of AAB and above61. 
On the other hand, the UK government stopped funding for overseas students and 
subject them to the full tuition fees since 1980 (Harris, 1995). Hence the recruitment of 
overseas students are not restricted, and with the immense funding pressure faced by 
the whole higher education sector, overtime more effort were put in by UK institutions 
to strengthen their presence in the international higher education market and attract 
more overseas students in order to boost their income. 
A number of regulations concerning student visas have also changed during this 
period, and overall the UK immigration rules governing overseas students have been 
toughened rather than relaxed over time. Prior to 2003, overseas students could renew 
their student visa free of charge in the UK. However, a visa extension charge of £15562 
was introduced in 2003 (for a postal application), and this figure stood at £357 in 2009 
and it costs £422 in 2014. The student visa application fee is around £100 in 200763, and 
it increased to £145 in 2009 and it costs £310 in 2014 (UKCISA, 2014) 64 . The UK 
government introduced a Points-Based Immigration System in 200865, and at the same 
time, overseas students who graduate from UK institutions with a degree or higher, 
were allowed to stay in the UK for up to 2 years to look for work/work experience 
without having to apply for a work permit66. This post study work scheme was abolished 
                                                          
61 This was lowered to ABB for the 2013/14 prospective student cohort. This policy change inevitably 
means more competition between institutions to attract students.  
62 http://www.theguardian.com/education/2004/nov/29/internationalstudents.students 
63 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/6428399.stm 
64 Throughout this period, the UK government has also gradually increased language requirement for a 
student visa, as well as the amount of (maintenance) funds the applicant need to have in their bank 
accounts   
65 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4244707.stm; 
http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/staff/pbcoverview.pdf 
66http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20081230092243/http:/www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/site
content/applicationforms/pbs/tier1poststudyworkguidance.pdf 
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in April 201267, and replaced with a Graduate Entrepreneur visa, for overseas graduates 
who have plans to set up businesses in the UK. However, for overseas students to apply 
for the Graduate Entrepreneur visa, they need to be endorsed by their university, and 
universities are limited to how many graduates they can endorse per year68.   
4.4 Data 
The data originates from three sources over the 11-year period of 2002/03 to 
2012/13. First, we have the aggregate first-year undergraduate student population data 
by institution, fee status (eligible vs not eligible to pay home fees) and 208 countries of 
domiciles (over the world), from the UK Higher Education Statistical Agency (HESA). This 
dataset covers all UK higher education institutions.  Next, we have the tuition fees data69 
by institutions and students’ domiciles70. Finally, to control for institutional quality, we 
have the Times Good (institutional-level) University Rankings. The Times is a popular 
newspaper in the UK and publishes the longest running national university rankings in 
the country (since 1992).  We use the university ranking score published in its annual 
university guide to reflect the quality of higher education provided by UK universities71. 
There are normally three levels of undergraduate tuition fees in the UK, namely 
home and EU student fees, overseas fees for classroom based courses and overseas fees 
for laboratory based courses. Of course in practice there can be more than three level 
of fees, particularly for overseas students72. In cases like this, the fees information are 
recorded as a range rather than a single figure, under one of the three aforementioned 
broad categories. We transform them by taking the average to make them comparable 
across institutions.  In a few cases the fee information is missing for some institutions in 
                                                          
67https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/261421/tier1postst
udyworkguidance1.pdf 
68 https://www.york.ac.uk/students/support/international/after/working/ 
69 Mike Reddin tuition fees data for the period of 2002-2011, and fee information for the 2012/13 
academic year is obtained from the Complete University Guide. 
70 UK/EU and overseas, the latter includes two fee bands, namely classroom based and laboratory based 
courses. 
71 The university rankings are published in the summer of each year to help prospective students decide 
which university they should apply for entry in the following year. 
72 For instance, certain business, law and medical degrees. 
http://www.qmul.ac.uk/docs/tuitionfees/2014/119002.pdf, 
https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/international/enquiry/money/tuitionfees.  
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certain years73, and we replace them by interpolating linearly. We use the classroom 
based course fees for overseas students74, and all fees are deflated to 2013 prices. 
We model students’ enrolment decisions by using the HESA first-year student 
population data, which are recorded in December of each academic year75. Since the 
level of tuition fees vary across the four constituent countries of the UK, we assign 
tuition fees according to the region of the institution, the student’s country of domiciles, 
and their fee eligibility. We note that European (EU) students are treated the same as 
locally domiciled students in each of the four countries in the UK. 
As described above, the UK tuition fees vary by 6 domiciles overall, namely 
England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, students from European (EEA) countries, 
and those from outside the Europe. Hence, we sum the yearly number of students in 
each institution and collapse the data by the 6 domiciles and fee eligibility. Any 
observations that are listed under “England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and 
European countries” but are “not eligible to pay home fees” are changed to “Non EU”, 
and any observations that are listed under “Non EU” but are “eligible to pay home fees” 
are changed to the region of UK where their institution is located76.    
Over the period of 2007 to 2012, some universities have changed their names or 
merged with other institutions to form new universities (for example, Victoria University 
of Manchester merged with UMIST (University of Manchester Institute of Science and 
Technology) in 2004 to form the University of Manchester). For the former cases, we 
have cleaned up the names of institutions so that they are consistent both across years 
and across the fees, rankings and student population datasets. For the latter, we treat 
institutions as separate before the merger and as a new institution afterwards.  
Overall, merging the student population data, the tuition fees information and 
university rankings gives us 119 institutions over the 11-year period. However, we note 
                                                          
73 17 observations with missing fee information, two of which are missing undergraduate home/EU fees. 
Reason for missing not explicitly given. 
74 For consistency reasons, since not all university offer lab-based courses to students.  
75 We define academic year as the September of each year to the September in the following year. We 
cannot rule out the possibility that some students may have dropped out between September (when 
the academic year starts) and December (when the HESA data is recorded). 
76 For example, “Non EU” domiciled students who are “eligible to pay home fees” are changed to 
“Scotland” if their institution is based in Scotland, i.e. these non EU students will be paying zero tuition 
fees as Scottish domiciled students. 
70 
 
that since the 2012/13 tuition fees data is collected from the Complete University 
Guide77, there are only 91 institutions in that year78. With the aforementioned merging 
of universities to form new institutions, the created panel is thus unbalanced.  
4.5 Model 
Our main objective is to estimate whether the number of first-year non-EU 
students enrolled at institution i in year j, yij, is a function of the level of tuition fees (xij). 
The number of students is log transformed to give a better fit of the model. The main 
equation depicting the relationship is 
log (yij) = βi + f(Tt) + δi* xij + εij 
where βi is the institution specific fixed effect (to control for location, reputation, and 
living costs at the location of the institution); f(Tt) is a function of time, which include 
year dummies, linear trend, and institution specific trends; and εijkl is the random error 
term. The main coefficient of interest to be estimated, δi, represents the percentage 
change in the number first-year non-EU students with every one thousand pound 
increase in tuition fees. The standard errors are robust and clustered at the institutional level 
to control for within-institution correlations and heteroskedasticity. 
It is important to note that we implicitly assume that foreign students have 
decided to study in the UK, and we only assess their price sensitivity to tuition fees 
conditional on studying in the UK. We assess the effect of tuition fees under two settings, 
the aggregate number of non-EU (1 domicile) students at each institution, and the 
country-level (208 countries of domiciles) number of non-EU students at each institution. 
From table 4.1, we can see that among all UK and European students, the English 
domiciled students pay the highest level of tuition fees during the period of 2002/03 to 
2012/13, and the average level of tuition fees for overseas students is around £10,550 
(2013 prices). Figure 4.1 shows the number of first-year undergraduate students by 
country of domiciles from 2002/03 to 2012/13. The number of English students, 
                                                          
77 The person who collected the tuition fees information for previous years, Mike Reddin, passed away 
in 2011, and the Complete University Guide took over the responsibility from 2012 onwards. 
78 See Appendix 4:A1. Although the fee information for a number of universities is missing in 2012 due 
to that they have merged with other institutions prior, for other institutions, there is no clear reasons 
(based on their characteristics) as to why their fee information is not available in that year.  
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European students and non-EU students have been gradually increasing until 2012/13, 
whilst the number of Northern Irish students, Scottish students, and Welsh students 
remained relatively unchanged during this period. Figure 4.2 shows the average UK 
tuition fees for students domiciled in different regions. Tuition fees for overseas 
students have been steadily increasing during the period of concern, from £10,000 to 
£12,000. English students have seen the highest level of tuition fees, whist Welsh and 
Scottish students have experienced lower fees, since they are able to benefit from 
tuition fee grants and zero tuition fees if they choose to study locally.  Average fees for 
European student and Northern Irish students changed very much in line with English 
students. 
Table 4.1  Descriptive Statistics       
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
number of first year students  
(by institution, academic year, and country 
of domicile) 
570.47 162.28 6720 
By students' domiciles:                 England 2509.67 367.71 1128 
Wales  141.08 52.74 1110 
Scotland 219.78 52.37 1111 
Northern Ireland 111.88 39.81 1118 
European countries 148.77 64.51 1128 
Non EU countries 274.62 103.24 1125 
tuition fees (2013 prices, in thousands, £) 4.19 1.51 6720 
By students' domiciles:                 England 3.11 1.77 1128 
Wales  2.72 0.95 1110 
Scotland 2.85 1.76 1111 
Northern Ireland 3.09 1.75 1118 
European countries 2.80 1.70 1128 
Non EU countries 10.55 0.84 1125 
ranking score 588.37 79.24 6720 
Note: Source: HESA (aggregate-level) student population data, Times institutional-level 
rankings and Reddin (& The Complete University Guide) tuition fees data, 2002 – 2012. 
We report the within institutions standard deviations. Although Scottish students pay 
zero fees in Scotland, they are subject to higher fees if they wish to study in other parts 
of the UK 
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Figure 4.1: Number of first-year undergraduate students by country of domiciles (in 
thousands) 
 
Note: source: HESA first-year undergraduate student population data (2002/03 – 2012/13)  
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Figure 4.2: UK average tuition fees for students of different country of domiciles. 
 
Note: Source: Mike Reddin (& The Complete University Guide) tuition fees data (2002/03 – 
2012/13)   
4.6 Results 
In Table 4.2, we assess how the effect of tuition fees on the size of (aggregate) 
non-EU student population79 vary under different specifications of the time effect. The 
effect of tuition fees are positive and statistically significant when year dummies 
(column 1) or linear trend (column 2) or are imposed. For each one thousand pound 
increase in tuition fees (2013 prices), the first-year undergraduate student population 
shrinks by about 6%. However, the effect of fees are not significant and work in the 
opposite direction when the institution specific trends are imposed (the preferred 
specification). The F-tests of time constraints in column 1 and column 3 show that they 
are all statistically significant. 
 
                                                          
79 i.e. one country of domicile only_”non-EU” 
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Table 4.2 (Institution) Fixed effects estimates: Price 
sensitivity of non-EU students 
  (1) 
VARIABLES 
log (total non-EU students - by 
institution, academic year) 
        
Overseas fees (2013 prices, in 
thousands, £) 0.0664** 0.0593** -0.0441 
 (0.0310) (0.0277) (0.0289) 
year dummies x  x 
trend  x  
institution specific trends   x 
    
F-test: year dummies  5.71  4.85 
(p-value) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
F-test: institution specific trends   2591.15 
(p-value)   (0.0000) 
    
Constant 4.544*** -36.88* 5.552*** 
 (0.289) (19.65) (0.275) 
    
Observations 1,125 1,125 1,125 
Number of institutions 119 119 119 
Adjusted R-squared 0.112 0.074 0.478 
Note: Source: HESA (aggregate-level) student population data, 
Times institutional-level rankings and Reddin (& The Complete 
University Guide) tuition fees data, 2002 – 2012. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In table 4.3, we test the robustness of previous results when institutional qualities 
are controlled for. We use the Times university level ranking score as proxies for 
institutional quality, and we find that controlling for quality does not change the 
previous estimates by much. However, an increase of £1,000 in overseas tuition fees 
lowers overseas student population by about by 5% (column 3), but this effect is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The magnitude of this estimate for non-EU 
students is roughly the same as the ones for domestic students found in Dearden et al. 
(2011) and Hemelt and Marcotte (2008). An increase of 100 points in Times university 
ranking score increases the size of overseas student population by about 10% in our 
favoured specification. The latter is consistent with previous findings (Soo and Elliot, 
2010; Broecke, 2012) on the effect of rankings on student applications, such that better 
ranked institutions attract more overseas students.  
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Table 4.3 Price sensitivity of non-EU students,  controlling for quality 
  
Fixed effects estimates 
System GMM 
estimates 
VARIABLES 
log (total non-EU students - by 
institution, academic year) 
log (total non-EU 
students - by 
institution, 
academic year ) 
          
Overseas fees (2013 prices, in 
thousands, £) 0.0492 0.0465* -0.0490* 0.0597 
 (0.0298) (0.0273) (0.0280) (0.0370) 
ranking score 0.182*** 0.0769*** 0.109** 0.176*** 
 (0.0476) (0.0278) (0.0425) (0.0313) 
year dummies x  x x 
linear trend  x   
institution specific trends   x  
institution dummies    x 
     
F-test: year dummies 6.71  5.29  
(p-value) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
F-test: institution specific 
trends   3319.15  
(p-value)   (0.0000)  
     
Constant 3.532*** -72.14*** 4.892*** 3.209*** 
 (0.439) (26.11) (0.362) (0.463) 
     
Observations 1,125 1,125 1,125 1,006 
Number of institutions 119 119 119 - 
Adjusted R-squared 0.140 0.085 0.484 0.854 
Note: Source: HESA (aggregate-level) student population data, Times institutional-level 
rankings and Reddin (& The Complete University Guide) tuition fees data, 2002 – 2012. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Fees are instrumented with lagged fees (period 1) 
for the System GMM estimates. Institution dummies are omitted in the fixed effects 
analysis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Overseas fees are highly correlated with the Times ranking score of universities 
(corr.=0.51), which could means that any positive effect that we find of fees on changes 
in first-year overseas student population could reflect that fees are acting as a signal for 
quality to overseas students, or that the better ranked institution can afford to increase 
their level of tuition fees and still attract students80. To test the robustness of our results 
against the potential endogeneity of the tuition fees, we run a system generalised 
method of moment estimation using lagged tuition fees (1-period) as an instrument 
(column 4, table 4.3). The results suggest that the level of overseas fees have no impact 
on student population, but the effect of institutional quality remains. This former is 
                                                          
80 In addition, admission of overseas students is conditional on the full payment of fees. 
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consistent with findings in Beine et al. (2012), after a GMM estimation is used to 
eliminate potential reverse causality in fees.   
Soo and Elliot (2010) find that overseas subject-level application numbers is 
positively linked to the number of applications from home students an institution 
receives, which may reflect some popularity or reputational effect that are not captured 
by the university rankings. Hence, we test the robustness of our results after controlling 
for changes in the number home and EU students at an institution (Table 4.4). We find 
that a 10% increase in the number of home/UK students at an institution increases the 
number of overseas students by about 3.5%. The number of European students however, 
does not seem to influence the size of overseas student population. Compared to table 
4.2, controlling for the number of home and EU students barely changes the estimate of 
effect of overseas fees on overseas student population. 
Table 4.4 (Institution) Fixed effects estimates: Price sensitivity 
of non-EU students, controlling for the number of home and 
EU stundents 
  (1) 
VARIABLES 
log (total non-EU students - by 
institution, academic year) 
        
Overseas fees (2013 prices, in 
thousands, £) 0.0690** 0.0627** -0.0426 
 (0.0312) (0.0297) (0.0298) 
log (total home/UK students - by 
institution, academic year) 0.346* 0.332* 0.389** 
 (0.183) (0.183) (0.153) 
log (total EU students - by institution, 
academic year) 0.0105 -0.0374 0.0654 
 (0.0693) (0.0670) (0.0730) 
year dummies x  x 
trend  x  
institution specific trends   x 
    
F-test: year dummies 5.20  6.16 
(p-value) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
F-test: institution specific trends   484.06 
(p-value)   (0.0000) 
    
Constant 1.821 -33.63 2.288** 
 (1.587) (24.79) (1.117) 
    
Observations 1,082 1,082 1,082 
Number of institutions 117 117 117 
Adjusted R-squared 0.123 0.086 0.496 
Note: Source: HESA (aggregate-level) student population data, Times 
institutional-level rankings and Reddin (& The Complete University 
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Guide) tuition fees data, 2002 – 2012. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We again test the robustness of results in table 4.4, after controlling for 
institutional quality (Table 4.5). Under the fixed effects set-up (column 1-3), the effect 
of overseas tuition fees are statistically significant at the 10%, but with different signs. 
The effect of fees are positive and measured at around 5% (for each £1,000 increase in 
fees) under the year dummies, but increase in fees lowers overseas student numbers 
under institution specific trends, with the effect measured around the same magnitude. 
Instrumenting the overseas fees with lagged fees under the GMM set-up (column 4) 
shows that a £1,000 increase in fees increases number of overseas students by about 
6%, but the effect is statistically significant at the 10% level.  A 100 points increase in 
university rankings scores increases the number of overseas students by about 10%, and 
a 10% increase in the number of home students increases overseas student population 
by about 4%. The effect of ranking score and the effect of home student population are 
statistically significant under both fixed effects and the GMM set up. 
Table 4.5 Price sensitivity of non-EU students, controlling for quality and the number of 
home and EU students  
  Fixed effects estimates System GMM estimates 
VARIABLES 
log (total non-EU students - by 
institution, academic year) 
log (total non-EU 
students - by institution, 
academic year) 
          
Overseas fees (2013 prices, in 
thousands, £) 0.0506* 0.0480* -0.0476* 0.0651* 
 (0.0294) (0.0279) (0.0286) (0.0352) 
log (total home/UK students- by 
institution, academic year) 0.395** 0.437** 0.395** 0.572*** 
 (0.183) (0.188) (0.153) (0.0626) 
log (total EU students- by 
institution, academic year -0.00100 -0.0315 0.0571 0.00903 
 (0.0659) (0.0668) (0.0716) (0.0498) 
ranking score 0.198*** 0.104*** 0.108** 0.193*** 
 (0.0481) (0.0289) (0.0421) (0.0318) 
year dummies x  x x 
trend  x   
institution specific trends   x  
institution dummies    x 
     
F-test: year dummies 6.45  6.32  
(p-value) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
F-test: institution specific trends   400.96  
(p-value)   (0.0000)  
78 
 
     
Constant 0.377 
-
76.25*** 1.615 -1.284*** 
 (1.681) (28.01) (1.144) (0.246) 
     
Observations 1,082 1,082 1,082 971 
Number of institutions 117 117 117  
Adjusted R-squared 0.157 0.105 0.502 0.853 
Note: Source: HESA (aggregate-level) student population data, Times institutional-level rankings 
and Reddin (& The Complete University Guide) tuition fees data, 2002 – 2012. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Overseas fees are instrumented with lagged fees (by 1 period) for system 
GMM estimates. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We also assess the effect of fees under the full non-EU student population sample, 
when institutional quality, and country specific economic conditions are controlled for 
(4:A2 – 4:A4, appendix). Overall, we do not find that overseas students react negatively 
to changes in tuition fees, but better ranked institutions attract more non-EU students, 
and higher GDP growth and smaller exchange rate fluctuations in the home country 
increases the size of the non-EU student population at an institution.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Estimating the price sensitivity of non-EU students to UK tuition fees over a panel 
of student population data across all UK institutions over the period of 2002/03 to 
20012/13, we find that overall, non-EU students do not react negatively to changes in 
tuition fees, and better ranked institutions, and institutions with higher number of home 
students attract more students from outside the Europe. 
Assessing the price sensitivity of non-EU students to UK (overseas) tuition fees has 
important policy implications. Considering that average within-institution variation of 
overseas students is around 103, and the average overseas tuition fees per year is 
around £12,000 in 2012/13, this means effectively a change of £1.2 million in institutions’ 
income. However, contrast to immigration policies on international students in other 
popular destination countries, where policies are introduced to streamline the visa 
application process, simplify requirements to student visas, and allow students to stay 
and gain work experience after their study (Australian government, 2011), the UK 
government on the other hand gradually increased the cost for non-EU students to come 
and study in the country, includes international students in the immigration target, and 
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withdrew the Post Study Work scheme for non-EU students in 2012. HEFCE (2014) 
reports that the drop in the number of non-EU students to English institutions in 
2012/13 is the first drop in 29 years. Hence, such policy changes could potentially harm 
the financial welfare of UK universities and damage UK universities’ presence in the 
international higher education market.   
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Appendix   
2: A1: Guardian methodologies over the period 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weights Year
Criteria used 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
(NSS) Course satisfaction 5%
(NSS)Teaching quality 10% 10% 10% 10%
(NSS)Feedback 5% 5% 5% 10%
Staff score 15% 15%
Teaching Quality Assessment 40% 22%
Spend per student 10% 15% 10% 10% 17% 17% 17% 15%
Student Staff ratio 10% 15% 20% 20% 17% 17% 17% 15%
Job prospects 15% 15% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 15%
Value added 15% 10% 10% 10% 17% 17% 17% 15%
Entry tariff 10% 15% 20% 20% 17% 17% 17% 15%
Inclusiveness 8% 8% 8%
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2: A2 – Number of institutions for each subject group over the period 
Subject \Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total number 
of institutions 
Average 
number of 
institutions 
Group A Medicine & Dentistry 23 25 25 27 30 30 30 30 32 28 
Group B Subjects allied to Medicine 87 88 94 91 85 81 84 87 106 87 
Group C Biological Sciences 110 112 113 114 112 110 110 111 119 112 
Group D Vet Sci,Ag & related 24 29 30 24 18 16 19 19 37 22 
Group F Physical Sciences 92 90 93 89 81 79 79 78 102 85 
Group G Mathematical & Comp Sci 110 109 112 109 108 101 101 105 117 107 
Group H Engineering 89 86 88 81 81 77 79 77 95 82 
Group J Technologies 14 14 14 15 10 10 11 12 23 13 
Group K Architecture,Build & Plan 60 57 59 57 54 48 54 53 66 55 
Group L Social Studies 107 112 112 111 109 102 108 107 120 109 
Group M Law 83 86 89 89 85 85 89 90 96 87 
Group N  Business & Admin studies 110 112 115 116 111 108 110 110 123 112 
Group P Mass Comms and Documentation 60 66 77 77 73 70 73 73 91 71 
Group Q Languages & Linguistics 101 105 106 108 105 98 102 104 114 104 
Group V Hist & Philosophical studies 86 96 97 98 93 88 91 93 104 93 
Group W Creative Arts & Design 111 115 123 118 115 111 113 113 132 115 
Group X Education 67 66 69 68 64 61 62 62 78 65 
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2: A3- List of subject groups included in the dataset 
                                                                                                                                                                  
JACS Subject Groups 
(UCAS) 
Subjects (Guardian) Cost centres (HESA) 
Group A Medicine & 
Dentistry 
Medicine, Dentistry (01) Clinical medicine; 
(02) Clinical dentistry 
Group B Subjects allied to 
Medicine 
Anatomy and physiology, Nursing 
and paramedical studies, 
Pharmacology and pharmacy 
(04) Anatomy & 
physiology; (05) Nursing 
& paramedical studies; 
(06) Health & community 
studies; (08) Pharmacy & 
pharmacology 
Group C Biological Sciences Biosciences, Psychology, Sports 
and exercise science 
(07) Psychology & 
behavioural sciences; (10) 
Biosciences; (38) Sports 
science & leisure studies 
Group D Vet Sci,Ag & 
related 
Agricultural and forestry, 
Veterinary science 
(03) Veterinary science; 
(13) Agriculture & 
forestry 
Group F Physical Sciences Chemistry, Physics, Archaeology 
and forensics, Earth and marine 
sciences, Geography and 
environmental studies 
(11) Chemistry; (12) 
Physics; (14) Earth, 
marine & environmental 
sciences; (28) Geography; 
(37) Archaeology 
Group G Mathematical & 
Comp Sci 
Mathematics, Computer sciences 
and IT 
(24) Mathematics; (25) 
Information technology & 
systems sciences & 
computer software 
engineering 
Group H Engineering Chemical engineering, Civil 
engineering, Electrical & 
electronic engineering, General 
engineering, Mechanical 
engineering 
(16) General engineering; 
(17) Chemical 
engineering; (19) Civil 
engineering; (20) 
Electrical, electronic & 
computer engineering; 
(21) Mechanical, aero & 
production engineering 
Group J Technologies Materials and mineral 
engineering 
 
(18) Mineral, metallurgy 
& materials engineering 
Group K Architecture, Build 
& Plan 
Architecture, Building and town 
and country planning 
(23) Architecture, built 
environment & planning 
Group L Social Studies Anthropology, Economics, 
Politics, Sociology, Social work, 
Social policy & administration 
(29) Social studies 
Group M Law Law (29) Social studies 
Group N Business & Admin 
studies 
Business and management 
studies, Tourism, transport and 
travel 
(26) Catering & 
hospitality management; 
(27) Business & 
management studies 
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Group P Mass Comms and 
Documentation 
Media studies, communications 
and librarianship 
(30) Media studies 
Group Q Languages & 
Linguistics 
Classics, English, Modern 
languages & linguistics,  American 
studies 
 (35) Modern languages 
Group V Hist & 
Philosophical studies 
History & history of art, 
Philosophy, Religious studies and 
theology 
(31) Humanities & 
language based studies; 
Group W Creative Arts & 
Design 
Art & design, Drama and dance, 
Music 
(33) Design & creative 
arts 
Group X Education Educational studies (41) Continuing 
education; (34) Education 
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Figure 3: A1 Google search frequency for “Graduate salary”. 
 
Source: Google trends for “Graduate salary” (http://www.google.co.uk/trends/?hl=en). The figures are 
based on the monthly number of searches on Google containing the term “Graduate salary”, and 
originates from the UK, over the period of 2006 – 2013. 
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T3: A1 Missing (expected) incomes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
expected 
wage upon 
graduation 
expected 
wage at 30 
with degree 
estimated wage 
for (uni) class 
peers at 30 
expected 
wage at 30 
without degree 
family 
income 
            
male -0.0370*** 0.0413* -0.0609*** 0.0388** -0.107*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0217) (0.0205) (0.0165) (0.0221) 
home fee status 0.0128 -0.227*** 0.000458 -0.208*** 0.00797 
 (0.0121) (0.0414) (0.0188) (0.0586) (0.0536) 
age on entry -0.00423 -0.0217* -0.00969 -0.0133 0.0203 
 (0.00502) (0.0117) (0.0109) (0.0100) (0.0127) 
ln (UCAS tariff) 0.0564*** -0.0809 -0.0201 -0.0232 -0.0321 
 (0.0198) (0.0506) (0.0393) (0.0262) (0.0458) 
missing UCAS tariff 0.0129 0.0683 0.0667** 0.0883* 0.00699 
 (0.0175) (0.0434) (0.0288) (0.0457) (0.0307) 
mother university 0.00890 -0.0148 0.0182 0.00698 0.0539* 
 (0.0203) (0.0547) (0.0330) (0.0492) (0.0280) 
father university 0.00196 0.00635 -0.0293 -0.0608 0.0108 
 (0.0153) (0.0460) (0.0421) (0.0442) (0.0465) 
parents own house 0.00877 0.0833 0.0359* 0.0679 -0.00859 
 (0.0237) (0.0690) (0.0212) (0.0577) (0.0471) 
ln (family income) 0.0124 0.0722*** 0.0223** 0.0684***  
 (0.0152) (0.0229) (0.00995) (0.0159)  
famincmis 0.107*** 0.102** 0.143*** 0.150***  
 (0.0226) (0.0401) (0.0239) (0.0411)  
year 2008 -0.00329 0.0276*** -0.00479 0.0120 -0.0269*** 
 (0.00524) (0.0107) (0.00687) (0.00773) (0.00489) 
year 2009 -0.0171*** 0.0118 -0.00768 -0.00878 -0.0397*** 
 (0.00438) (0.0113) (0.0108) (0.0112) (0.00730) 
year 2010 -0.0299*** -0.0707*** -0.0557*** -0.118*** -0.218*** 
 (0.00633) (0.00476) (0.00598) (0.00667) (0.00880) 
year 2011 -0.0340*** -0.0329 -0.00808 -0.000560 -0.153*** 
 (0.00902) (0.0233) (0.0128) (0.0331) (0.0175) 
year 2012 -0.0152*** 0.00515 0.00266 -0.00540 -0.151*** 
 (0.00573) (0.00674) (0.00798) (0.00957) (0.00789) 
year 2013 -0.0303*** 0.0541*** -0.000786 -0.0468*** -0.235*** 
 (0.00559) (0.00997) (0.0111) (0.00596) (0.00792) 
ethnicity dummies x x x x x 
      
Observations 946 973 973 973 973 
Note: Probit marginal effect estimates. Dependent variable equal to 1 if income information missing. 
Ethnicity1_ white British, year 2007 are used as reference groups. Column (1) has smaller number of 
observations since ethnicity 9_ Pakistani predicts failure perfectly (i.e. All Pakistani students in our 
sample reported their expected starting salaries). Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3: A2 Possible changes in the composition of students since 2012 
VARIABLES first year student in or after 2012 
          
home fee status 0.0361 -0.630* -0.448 -0.0551 
 (0.0573) (0.348) (0.885) (0.144) 
male 0.0419 0.00613 0.00398 0.00449 
 (0.0357) (0.0298) (0.0299) (0.0306) 
home x male -0.0563    
 (0.0647)    
home x age on entry  0.0339   
  (0.0230)   
home x ln (UCAS tariff)   0.0754  
   (0.165)  
home x ln (family 
income)    0.0134 
    (0.0223) 
age on entry -0.00949* -0.0298** -0.00870 -0.00927* 
 (0.00536) (0.0143) (0.00569) (0.00543) 
ln (UCAS tariff) -0.199** -0.197** -0.244* -0.203** 
 (0.0808) (0.0797) (0.125) (0.0825) 
missing UCAS tariff 0.0174 0.0184 0.0193 0.0174 
 (0.0820) (0.0804) (0.0850) (0.0826) 
ln (family income) -0.00735 -0.00779 -0.00833 -0.0145 
 (0.0212) (0.0210) (0.0187) (0.0317) 
missing family income -0.0695 -0.0709 -0.0689 -0.0719 
 (0.0510) (0.0517) (0.0504) (0.0508) 
     
Observations 1,046 1,046 1,046 1,046 
Note: Probit marginal effect estimates. Dependent variable equal to 1 if student 
enrolled in or after 2012. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
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4: A1 missing institutions in 2012  
Institutions  Notes 
Anglia Ruskin 
Post 1992 new 
university 
Brunel  
Chichester 
University status Oct 
2005 
City  
De Monfort  
Post 1992 new 
university 
Edge Hill 
University status May 
2006 
Glamorgan 
Post 1992 new 
university-merged into 
University of South 
Wales April 2013 
Gloucestershire University status 2001 
Imperial College London  
Kingston 
Post 1992 new 
university 
Lampeter 
Merged with Trinity 
University College in 
2010 to form 
University of Wales, 
Trinity Saint David 
Lincoln 
Post 1992 new 
university 
Liverpool John Moores 
Post 1992 new 
university 
London South Bank 
Post 1992 new 
university 
Loughborough  
Middlesex  
Newport 
Merged into University 
of South Wales April 
2013 
Paisley 
Merged with Bell 
College to form 
University of West of 
Scotland, August 2007 
Teesside 
Post 1992 new 
university 
Trinity Saint David  
UMIST (University of Manchester 
Institute of Science and Technology) 
Merged with Victoria 
University of 
Manchester to form 
University of 
Manchester in 2004 
Victoria Manchester 
Merged with UMIST to 
form University of 
Manchester in 2004 
Warwick  
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West of Scotland  
Westminster 
Post 1992 new 
university 
Wolverhampton 
Post 1992 new 
university 
York St John University status 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
4: A2 Non EU students' fee sensitivity, fixed effects 
estimates 
  (1) 
VARIABLES 
log (total non-EU students - by 
institution, country of domiciles, 
academic year) 
        
Overseas fees 0.0245 0.0242 -0.0170 
 (0.0157) (0.0149) (0.0128) 
year dummies  x  x 
trend  x  
institution specific trends   x 
    
Constant 0.616*** -44.84*** 0.962*** 
 (0.153) (9.541) (0.122) 
    
Observations 43,908 43,908 43,908 
Number of groups 
(observations by institution, 
country of domicile) 10,828 10,828 10,828 
Adjusted R-squared 0.023 0.021 0.061 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4: A3 Non EU students' fee sensitivity, fixed effects estimates, 
controlling for quality 
VARIABLES 
log (total non-EU students - by 
institution, country of domiciles, 
academic year) 
        
overseas fees 0.0165 0.0169 -0.0189 
 (0.0151) (0.0139) (0.0123) 
ranking score  0.0858*** 0.0430*** 0.0444** 
 (0.0288) (0.0153) (0.0213) 
institution specific trends   x 
year dummies x  x 
trend  x  
    
Constant 0.120 -64.97*** 0.680*** 
 (0.251) (12.61) (0.175) 
    
Observations 43,908 43,908 43,908 
Number of groups 
(observations by institution, 
country of domiciles) 10,828 10,828 10,828 
Adjusted R-squared 0.026 0.022 0.062 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4: A4 Non EU students' fee sensitivity, fixed effects estimates, controlling for quality 
and economic conditions 
VARIABLES 
log (total non-EU students - by institution, country of domiciles, 
academic year) 
        
Overseas fees 0.0144 0.0126 -0.0148 
 (0.0155) (0.0138) (0.0126) 
ranking score 0.0939*** 0.0591*** 0.0475** 
 (0.0309) (0.0180) (0.0234) 
inflation rate (GDP deflator) 0.000647 -0.0000798 0.0007636* 
 (0.0004157) (0.0003952) (0.0004253) 
GDP growth 0.0020385** -0.0010714 0.0021069** 
 (0.0009306) (0.0009659) (0.0009275) 
exchange rate fluctuation -0.000000622*** -6.46e-07***  -6.63e-07***  
 (1.53e-07) (1.51e-07 ) (1.49e-07) 
institution specific trends   x 
year dummies x  x 
trend  x  
    
Constant 0.0373 -86.36*** 0.562*** 
 (0.281) (14.87) (0.195) 
    
Observations 37,401 37,401 37,401 
Number of groups 
(observations by institution, 
country of domiciles) 9,744 9,744 9,744 
Adjusted R-squared 0.033 0.028 0.073 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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